Abstract
Although the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) obliges UK courts to take into account European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) jurisprudence, the case Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v Switzerland (Verein) relies on unincorporated international treaties, and thus cannot be domestically implemented by UK courts. Even if this can be overcome, the separation of powers (SoP) as understood by UK courts would hinder the full implementation of Verein through a less stringent judicial review than envisioned by Verein. However, despite these domestic legal challenges, the courts might nonetheless implement Verein not on legal but on pragmatic and policy grounds through a legal fiction.
Introduction
The ECtHR, which is the body tasked with interpreting the ECHR, recognised in Verein the positive obligations of states to mitigate the adverse effects of climate change under Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights.[1]
While this might provide the necessary impetus for judiciaries to hold the government accountable for insufficient climate change measures, this essay argues that this judgment cannot be implemented in the UK, as following Verein would lead to the implementation of unincorporated sources of international law in the UK, which is prohibited in the existing constitutional setting.
Even if this can be overcome, this essay then argues that Verein’s incompatibility with the Separation of Powers (SoP) as understood by UK courts would either rule out any possibility of future implementation or constrain it to such an extent as to effectively rule out judicial review relying on Verein.
This essay will firstly elaborate on the judgment in Verein, broadly summarising the main principles relevant for the current discussion before explaining the domestic position in the UK on the following ECtHR judgments. It will then address Verein’s reliance on international treaties, making it unsuitable for UK courts. This essay will then evaluate the conflict that Verein poses for the SoP, and the ramifications this would have for domestic judicial review. Finally, it will also aim to provide insight into the future of climate change litigation in the UK and ways forward for UK courts in dealing with Verein.
Please note that this essay does not deal with the question of whether it would be beneficial for UK climate change efforts if Verein were implemented. It could be argued so, but from a strictly legal and constitutional perspective, domestic courts are obligated to refuse enforcement.
Overview of Verein
The claimants were an association of elderly women alleging that certain Swiss public bodies failed to take positive steps to uphold their obligations under the ECHR by not implementing a sufficient emissions reduction trajectory consistent with international agreements. Arguing that they were especially vulnerable to climate change, they demanded that the government take sufficient climate mitigation measures to lower greenhouse gas emissions.
The ECtHR found a violation of Article 8 of the ECHR by Switzerland, which was affirmed to include a right to be protected from the adverse effects of climate change.[2] The court also found a positive obligation for states under the ECHR to mitigate the effects of climate change through legislative and administrative frameworks.
The court distinguished the margin of appreciation, or the leeway given to states to design frameworks, in setting up climate change targets and implementing measures to meet those targets. The court found states to have a narrow margin of appreciation in the former and a wide margin in the latter.[3] Switzerland was found liable on the narrow ground, finding Lacunae in the Swiss government’s climate change framework, and therefore a violation of Article 8.[4]
The HRA and the approach of domestic courts in implementing ECtHR jurisprudence
The Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998 gave domestic effect to ECHR rights in the UK. Section 2(1) states that domestic courts should “take into account” judgments of the ECtHR on Convention rights.[5] The meaning of this has been widely settled in UK case law, encapsulated by Lord Neuberger in Pinnock v Manchester City Council, where he affirmed that domestic courts have a choice whether to implement ECtHR judgments domestically and have a statutory duty to confront this question.[6]
The following question then arises: in what circumstances can UK courts distinguish, narrow, or altogether decline to enforce ECtHR judgments based on domestic circumstances?
The Independent Human Rights Act Review 2021[7] lists some instances where UK courts have refused to follow ECtHR jurisprudence. This includes when there is only one judgment on the issue, it was criticised when it was made, or when the ECtHR’s decision is based on a misunderstanding of, or failed to take account of, UK law or constitutional principle. Although all three might well apply in this case, this essay will focus on the third factor as the criticism of Verien as a landmark decision directly relates to its implications for the UK’s domestic constitutional considerations.
Unincorporated domestic treaties
UK domestic position
Verein’s reliance on the Paris Agreement, which has not been incorporated into domestic law by Parliament, would justify UK courts refusing to follow ECtHR jurisprudence.
Lord Reed in R (SC) v SSWP emphasised the constitutional principle that an international treaty that has not been incorporated domestically by parliament does not form part of the domestic law in UK and hence, cannot be enforced domestically.[8] Indeed, the ECHR rights can only be enforced domestically due to their domestic incorporation as part of the HRA.[9] The court also affirmed that the HRA has not given effect to treaties other than the ECHR.[10]
It is to be noted that there is no legal issue with the ECtHR using international agreements to inform its judgments as an interpretive aid, as UK courts too have done. However, the legal issue arises when the ECtHR effectively utilises an international agreement as the benchmark for finding a violation of the ECHR, where compliance with the international agreement becomes the test for compliance with the ECHR. Indeed, it can be said that there is a subtle yet distinct difference between, on the one hand, relying on the Paris Agreement to inform its judgment and, on the other hand, using the Paris Agreement as the test for compliance, and it is this latter element that this article aims to establish.
As the first case on climate change the Court has addressed,[11] the ECtHR’s handling of other environmental harm cases that are specific to a certain localised incident can shed some light on the issue of using unincorporated international agreements.
Indeed, domestically within the UK, courts rely on international treaties in their judgments without directly enforcing them. For example, in Morgan v Hinton Organics (Morgan) in respect of the Aarhus Convention (Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters), the court held that although the Convention cannot be directly enforced domestically, it could “be taken into account in resolving ambiguities in legislation intended to give it effect.”[12] If the ECtHR had used the Paris Agreement in a similar way in Verein, there would not be any issue.
Hence, although the common law can be developed using unincorporated treaties[13] and common law developments should be in harmony with international obligations,[14] they cannot be directly enforced.
Verein’s reliance on the Paris Agreement
Confronting the central debate in this section, this article argues that the ECtHR effectively enforced the Paris Agreement and is different from the other UK or ECtHR cases that use international agreements. Accordingly, as stated by Judge Eicke’s dissent, the court created a right not included in the Convention. In Verein, the court says:
“In line with the international commitments undertaken by the Member States, most notably under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement….. the Contracting States need to put in place the necessary regulations and measures aimed at preventing an increase in GHG concentrations in the Earth’s atmosphere and a rise in global average temperature.”[15]
Here, the court used the benchmark set by the Paris Agreement of limiting global warming to 1.5°C as the very standard by which to find a violation, evidently different from merely informing its judgment.
In other words, Article 8 is violated because the Paris Agreement is violated rather than finding a violation of Article 8 directly.
This is perhaps due to the peculiarity of climate change cases, where causation is an exceedingly difficult issue to consider. In cases with a localised environmental disaster, causation is a relatively straightforward issue, as the environmental disaster in question can be identified. However, due to the difficulties in proving climate change, including the court highlighting the lack of specific sources of harm and the complexity and unpredictability of climate change effects, the court must rely on a benchmark set by an international treaty to find causation and, therefore, a violation of Article 8, without which it would not be possible to find Switzerland liable.
Although there have not been cases where UK courts have refused implementation of an ECtHR judgment on the grounds that they would be enforcing an unincorporated treaty, there are domestic cases regarding the Paris Agreement that shed light on this issue.
A key case is Plan B Earth and four other citizens v. Prime Minister (Plan B Earth), where the Paris Agreement was relied on to challenge the UK’s climate change policies. The claimants argued that the Paris Agreement was relied on to “show that a failure to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels poses the threat to life on which the claims are based,” and were seeking to not enforce it domestically.[16]
However, the court in Plan B Earth held that compliance with the Paris Temperature Limit was used as a test for compliance with the ECHR, and hence the Paris Agreement would be domestically enforced.[17] The same principle applies here as compliance with the Paris temperature limit of limiting global warming to 1.5°C was used to find a violation of the ECHR in Verein. It is precisely because the court identified that global warming above this level would have adverse impacts on the rights under Article 8 that the court found in favour of the claimants. Hence, this transforms the Paris Agreement from an interpretive aid to be used as the test for compliance (where violation of the Paris Agreement is equated with violation of the ECHR), which conflicts with the UK’s constitutional norms of refusing to enforce unincorporated international treaties.
I would take a different position than scholars such as Ebru Demir, who argue that the ECtHR’s reference to such international law aligns with its existing practice of incorporating international instruments into its decisions.[18] If the ECtHR’s reference to international law aligned with its past practice of using such law as an interpretive aid, there would be no challenge to its domestic implementation in the UK. However, as argued, this is not the case as the use of such treaties goes beyond mere interpretive aids. Past environmental cases, such as Taşkin and others v. Turkey, highlight the Aarhus Convention as a relevant international text on the right to a healthy environment.[19] The court does no more than merely identify it as a relevant text. The court in Verein went significantly beyond this and used the Paris Agreement as the test for compliance, rather than identifying it as merely a relevant text.
The author further argues that the ECtHR relies on such international law sources without explaining the way it influenced the judgment and typically uses phrasing such as : [t]he relevant parts of the (…) Convention read as follows. Indeed, this was the phrasing used in Taşkin and the Aarhus Convention was identified as a relevant text in a separate section and was not explicitly referred to in its judgment or reasoning.[20] However, I would disagree with Demir’s argument that it is difficult to know how such international law sources influenced the Verein judgment, as it is much clearer here. In Verein, the court did not identify the Paris Agreement in a separate section, but it was explicitly referenced in the passage setting out the court’s reasoning. Hence, it is clearer in Verein that the ECtHR used unincorporated treaties as the test for compliance with Article 8.
Additionally, this article also acknowledges that there has been a recent UK judgment on Verein, namely Friends of the Earth & Ors, R (On the Application Of) v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.[21]However, this case was on adaptation (minimising the impact of climate change after its effects are evident) rather than mitigation strategies (preventing it in the first place). The court held that Verein pertains to mitigation and was not directly applicable to a case on adaptation.
However, the court did state that the Paris Agreement played a large part in the court’s analysis on the positive obligations under Article 8 of the ECHR.[22] The court would not hold that it played a “large part” if it was not possible to identify its impact on the court, in contrast to Demir’s claim that it is not possible to know the influence of international sources in the judgment.
Muhanad Alarnro argues that the court relied on broader international obligations beyond ECHR rights, and that accepting Judge Eicke’s dissent, who stated that the court created a new right not included in the ECHR, would deny the utility of such broader international treaties in its reasoning.[23] However, this would be incorrect to say, as we would only be rejecting utilising international treaties as a test for compliance with ECHR, as opposed to considering them in the interpretation of ECHR rights. International treaties would still play a key role in informing the court’s interpretation.
This may seem like a subtle difference, but one that the court in Plan B Earth has held to be significant and one that domestic courts must be mindful of. Hence, the ECtHR has not merely used the Paris Agreement to inform its judgment, but rather has used it as the test for compliance for Article 8, the domestic enforcement of which would amount to the implementation of an unincorporated international agreement, contradicting Plan B Earth.
Separation of Powers
The second point on which Verein is incompatible with the UK constitutional design is the SoP.
Although the SoP is an elusive principle, for the context of this essay, it refers to the judiciary not encroaching on issues that are for parliament to consider due to their political, social, or economic complexity, which makes them more suitable for deliberation in a democratic forum.
This article argues that domestic courts ought to be wary of implementing Verein on the grounds of SoP, as this would increase the intensity of judicial review, and even if implemented, the deference provided by courts to parliament would render judicial oversight a virtual impossibility. Furthermore, this section also argues that the courts will hesitate to distinguish between the narrow and wide margins of appreciation.
Verein’s impact on the UK’s SoP
This article will firstly explain the domestic standard for judicial review in climate change cases before analysing the impact of Verein on increasing the scrutiny of domestic judicial review. As such, this section will conclude that the Verein’s impact on increasing the standard of domestic judicial review ought to make courts vary in deciding whether to implement the Verein.
In Regina v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and The Regions, the court held that the UK courts are not bound by decisions of the ECtHR if it “compelled a conclusion fundamentally at odds with the distribution of powers under the British constitution.”[24]
The court in Verein further acknowledges this judicial overreach, stating judicial intervention cannot substitute legislative action, which is better placed to address climate change but is complementary to it in this context. However, the court identifies this as an issue of policy and law.[25]
Historically, UK courts, however, have shown restraint in adjudicating matters of climate change. Plan B Earth highlights that the climate change framework “consists of high-level economic and social measures involving complex and difficult judgments” and that the Court is not well equipped to form its own views on the matters in question.[26]
Nevertheless, Friends of the Earth & Ors v Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero (Friends of the Earth) found a violation of section 13 of the Climate Change Act 2008, which requires adopting policies that enable meeting carbon reduction targets.[27] The relevance of this case for the article lies in the fact that, although the courts did hold the government liable for failing to meet climate change goals, it was done relying on Wednesbury unreasonableness rather than a proportionality approach that Verein’s implementation would demand. This is significant as a proportionality test is more stringent than Wednesbury unreasonableness.
Wednesbury unreasonableness is a form of judicial review where courts will find liability against a public body’s decision if it was so unreasonable that no reasonable body could have arrived at it, and the court held that this would require something overwhelming.[28] Friends of the Earth found the government liable on this ground as the government made decisions not justified by evidence as previous reviews provided to the Secretary of State expressed had low confidence in meeting targets.[29]
This is a surprising decision given that in R (on the application of SC, CB and 8 children) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions and others, [R(SC)], the supreme court stated that in matters where the state enjoys a wide margin of appreciation, namely social and economic policy, the judgment of the executive or legislature “will generally be respected unless it is manifestly without reasonable foundation”[30] Plan B Earth endorses this test in climate change cases.[31] This MWRF test provides even greater deference to parliament. In fact, Conor Gearty argues that MWRF goes beyond the Wednesbury unreasonableness testand effectively isolates the decision maker from judicial review.[32]
Despite this high threshold and the low intensity of review that Friends of the Earth did indeed adopt, also emphasising the importance of parliament in climate change issues,[33] the court nevertheless found the government to have violated the Climate Change Act 2008. The ratio of the decision was that the decision was Wednesbury unreasonable and irrational.[34] There was no discussion in the judgment of the court of the MWRF test, potentially indicating that domestic courts are willing to use a less stringent review through the Wednesbury rather than the MWRF test in climate change cases, and therefore might indicate the court’s willingness to take a different approach than R(SC) and Plan B Earth. However, this is not stated explicitly and engaging with this decision would have clarified the domestic standard to be used, as future courts might use a different standard. Hence, the test to be applied under domestic law is currently unclear, as the Wednesbury unreasonableness test employed in Friends of the Earth conflicts with the MWRF test advocated for in Plan B earth and R(SC).
Nevertheless, both these standards of review call for a greater intensity than the proportionality test to be applied under ECtHR cases, and SoP might still work to constrain the level of judicial review enforced by courts. Although Friends of the Earth held the government liable, using the Wednesbury unreasonableness test, Verein’s implementation would require domestic courts to use a proportionality test, making it easier to find the government liable.[35] This is because cases to be dealt with under the HRA rely on the proportionality approach, where a decision can be no more than necessary to achieve a legitimate aim.[36] Friends of the Earth was dealt with under the Climate Change Act 2008 and hence used the Wednesbury unreasonableness test. UK courts might thus be reluctant to implement Verein, which would mean adopting a more intense form of review using proportionality for climate change matters that would increase the scrutiny of judicial review further, given the deference to parliament on such matters. Or alternatively, the court might justify a low standard of review using proportionality to isolate decision makers from judicial review.
Distinction between the narrow and wide margin of appreciation
Friends of the Earth dealt with the inadequacy of measures to meet existing carbon targets, not with laying down these targets themselves.[37] The Climate Change Act 2008 does not provide courts with the power to set targets themselves, as this is a task for parliament, and setting targets themselves would be a violation of their constitutional duty to parliament. Hence, even if courts implement Verein and call for a proportionality approach, this proportionality approach will likely be applied in relation to the wide margin (the measures to be taken to combat climate change), rather than a narrow margin (setting up climate change targets in the first place). Hence, it is unlikely UK courts will distinguish between the narrow and wide grounds and restrict judicial review to the Climate Change Act 2008, as Verein leaves scope for domestic courts to determine the extent of judicial review that is appropriate in climate change cases while accommodating domestic specificities regarding the SoP.[38] This can be attributed to the deference of domestic courts towards parliament in climate change cases, as a narrow margin would see greater judicial scrutiny than a wide margin.
This was an approach echoed by the Swedish Supreme court in Auroramålet. The claimants, like Verein, stated that the country’s climate change mitigation efforts were inadequate and violated ECHR rights.[39] The court addressed the extent to which claims under Verein fell within the Swedish constitutional mandate and emphasised constitutional limits on adjudicating political matters.[40] The court held that even if claimants do not seek a specific legislative amendment, a declaration affirming an Article 8 violation might still contradict the SoP and did not distinguish between a narrow and wide margin of appreciation, as it did not confront the adequacy of national mitigation goals.[41]Linnéa Nordlander argues that this falls short of the ECtHR approach in Verein.[42]
UK courts could implement Verein in a similar fashion, in a manner falling short of Verein by refusing a demarcation between the wide and narrow margin,similar to the Swedish court. Hence, any climate change cases in the UK would likely be made on the grounds affording a wide margin of appreciation.
Implementing Verein as a “legal fiction”
Here, legal fiction is used in the same vein as that used by Barber. Barber asserts that the law sometimes develops through legal fiction, which occurs when rules are stretched to cover new problems that are deserving of legal protection but fall outside the protection of existing law.[43] This provides a superficial legal legitimisation.[44] In this context, the courts use creative legal reasoning that is justified on non-legal grounds. The idea of a legal fiction suggested by Barber can provide another perspective to evaluate the court’s reasoning.
Interestingly, Verein also emphasised the importance of the court being mindful of past state inadequacy in combating climate change and that the case involved “compelling present-day conditions…..which the court cannot ignore” and considers the necessity of addressing this urgent threat.[45]
In this regard, Judge Eicke’s dissent states that as a result of the court’s urgency to address climate change, it has gone beyond what was legally permissible for it to do.[46] However, the court in Verein, by recognising policy needs and despite the argument that it might be legally improper, the court might have prioritised the urgency to combat climate change by drawing on an idea of a legal fiction.
Indeed, in R (SC), the court does acknowledge that there can be a range of factors to lower or increase the intensity of review.[47] The court can highlight the importance of climate change to further increase the intensity of review.
As such, perhaps it would be incorrect to analyse this case through a constitutional or strictly legal lens. Although courts might not necessarily be legally or constitutionally justified, they might be justified on other, more practical or pragmatic grounds, such as the lack of government action coupled with the urgency of climate change.
However, even on pragmatic grounds, whether this is something that must be done is unclear. As Judge Eicke states, the court’s decision might be an unwelcome hindrance for political actors.[48] Policy makers might be sceptical of making new climate change commitments for fears of litigation or would have to commit more resources to climate change litigation. Indeed, Switzerland views this as judicial activism and aimed to insist that their existing measures are sufficient and did not order other legislative changes.[49]The previous Conservative government in the UK has expressed similar views, leading to further demands to withdraw from the ECHR.[50]
If they chose to do so, however, this would require overruling past case law, such as Plan B Earth and the cases on SoP quoted above or drawing some superficial distinction to justify fully implementing Verein. Indeed, the courts might step beyond their legal remit, and the ECtHR might have realised this, but thought it was such an issue where it was warranted for the courts to do so and acknowledge the greater supervisory role of courts. This would usher in a new SoP model in the UK – one that is characterised by legal constitutionalism, which refers to the courts taking a greater role than before to limit government power. Parliament and political constitutionalists who advocate for holding power to account through political processes would oppose this new SoP arrangement.
As a passing note, it is worth keeping in mind that if parliament were to incorporate the Paris Agreement domestically, then there would be no incompatibility, suggesting that parliament must take stronger efforts to combat climate change, according to the courts.
Conclusion
This article has aimed to provide an account of the approaches that domestic courts might take on legal or constitutional grounds towards addressing Verein, arguing that, despite any constitutional incompatibility that exists, UK courts might implement Verein on other practical grounds in the interest of combating climate change.
Although the broader merits of Verein in a mitigation context have not been considered in the UK yet, there would likely be a case in the not-too-distant future when Verein is relied on to argue that the UK’s climate change efforts are insufficient, which would require the courts to address the issues expressed in this article. Whatever the case, due to the demands of climate change action, the courts might have to get involved in one of the most complex societal issues that it might not be best placed to consider, but one it must face nonetheless.
[1] Verein Klimaseniorinnen Schweiz and others v. Switzerland App No 53600/20 (ECtHR Grand Chamber, 9 April 2024)
[2] Verein (n 1)
[3] Verein (n 1), para 542
[4] Verein (n 1), para 573
[5] Human Rights Act 1998, s 2(1)
[6] Pinnock v Manchester City Council [2010] UKSC 45 [48]
[7] Independent Human Rights Act Review 2021 Cp 586, p. 64
[8] R (SC) v SSWP [2021] UKSC 26 [77]
[9] Human Rights Act 1998
[10] R (SC) v SSWP (n 8) [79]
[11] Verein (n 1), para 414
[12] Morgan & Anor v Hinton Organics (Wessex) Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 107 [22]
[13] R v Lyons [2003] 1 AC 976 (HL) [13]
[14] A v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No 2) [2006] 2 AC 221 (HL) [27]
[15] Verein (n 1) para 546
[16] [2021] EWHC 3469 [52]
[17] Plan B Earth and four other citizens v. Prime Minister (n 16) [53]
[18] Ebru Demir, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration at the ECtHR after Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz’ (Oxford Human Rights Hub, 27 May 2024) <https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/the-principle-of-systemic-integration-at-the-ecthr-after-verein-klimaseniorinnen-schweiz/>
[19] Taşkin and others v. Turkey App No 46117/99 (ECtHR, 10 November 2004, para 98-100
[20] Taşkin (n 19), para 98-100
[21] [2024] EWHC 2707 (Admin)
[22] Friends of the Earth & Ors, R (On the Application Of) v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2024] EWHC 2707 (Admin) [98]
[23] Muhanad Alarnro, ‘KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland: How the ECtHR Applies Its Environmental Case Law in the Context of Climate Change’ [2025] 19 Climate Law Review 190, 196
[24] [2002] UKHL 23 [76]
[25] Verein (n 1) para 412, 450
[26] Plan B Earth (n 16) [50]-[51]
[27] Friends of the Earth & Ors v Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero [2024] EWHC 995 (Admin) [1]-[2]
[28] Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB [223], [229]
[29] Friends of the Earth & Ors v Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero (n 28) [127]
[30] R (on the application of SC, CB and 8 children) (Appellants) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions and others (Respondents) [2021] UKSC 26, [2021] 3 WLR 428 [158]
[31] Plan B Earth (n 16) [50]
[32] Conor Gearty, ‘In the Shallow End’ (2022) 44 London Review of Books 2 <Earthhttps://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v44/n02/conor-gearty/in-the-shallow-end> accessed 21 January 2026.
[33]Friends of the Earth & Ors v Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero (n 28) [141] – [142]
[34] Friends of the Earth & Ors v Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero (n 28) [127]
[35] R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Daly [2001] UKHL 26 [27]
[36] R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Daly [2001] UKHL 26
[37] Friends of the Earth & Ors v Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero (n 28) [1] – [2]
[38] Linnéa Nordlander, ‘Constitutional boundaries after Verein KlimaSeniorinnen: Lessons on domestic rights-based climate change litigation from the Swedish Supreme Court’s Aurora Judgment’ [2025] 34 Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law 566, 569
[39] Nordlander (n 39), 566-567
[40] Nordlander (n 39), 568
[41] Nordlander (n 39), 568
[42] Nordlander (n 39), 568
[43] N. W. Barber, The United Kingdom Constitution: An Introduction (Oxford University Press 2009) ch 5
[44] Barber (n 44)
[45] Verein (n 1), para 413
[46] Verein (n 1), para 4 Judge Eicke’s dissent
[47] R(SC) (n 31) [99]
[48] Verein (n 1), para 69 Judge Eicke’s dissent
[49] ‘Switzerland: Failing to comply with European Court’s ruling on climate protection not an option’ (International Commission of Jurists, 3 September 2024) <https://www.icj.org/switzerland-failing-to-comply-with-european-courts-ruling-on-climate-protection-not-an-option/> accessed 14 January 2026
[50] Andrew McDonald, ‘How a group of elderly Swiss women could take the UK out of the European Court’ (Politico, 11 April 2024) <https://www.politico.eu/article/uk-echr-switzerland-climate-ruling-could-blow-up-uk-politics/> accessed 25 February 2026
Sourish Gangannagari
LLB (LSE) ’27 and Notes Editor of the LSE Law Review 2025-26