Abstract.
This article explores Domestic Abuse (DA) law in England and Wales and attempts to redefine it to respond to the nascent issue of tech-facilitated abuse, with a particular focus on online abuse taking place in the context of Long-Distance Intimate Relationships (LDIRs). Firstly, we need to address the following two questions: ‘what makes violence, domestic violence? And specifically, what do we mean by domestic?’. [1] Answering these questions is crucial for our understanding of the broad nature of DA, and this article does so by analysing influential research in the field, specifically Dempsey and Stark’s conceptualisation of DA. To supplement this broad definition further, the article situates itself in the definitions in the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 (DAA 2021) to illustrate why the term ‘domesticity’ should extend to apply in the online context, and specifically in the context of LDIRs. The suggested expansion is supported by both theoretical accounts positing that our digital presence is shaped by and shapes our social life, as well as empirical evidence that places online abuse as one of the most common types of abuse in the UK. As a result, the article puts forward the opinion that this category of ‘online domestic abuse’ warrants specialised legal protection. The article concludes by looking at the current and future legal trajectory, briefly touching upon the new Online Safety Act 2023 (OSA 2023), to speculate and supplement the direction Ofcom will and should take with regard to the issue at hand.
- Introduction: The Definition and Trajectory of Domestic Abuse.
In order to discuss Domestic Abuse (DA), we must first attempt to define it. The UK government’s definition for DA ‘has varied over time’.[2] The most recent development is the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 (DAA 2021) which introduced a statutory definition for DA.[3] More specifically, under the Act, behaviour is deemed ‘abusive’ if it falls under any of the following types: physical or sexual abuse, violent or threatening behaviour, controlling or coercive behaviour, economic abuse, and physical, emotional, or other. Prima and ex facie, this definition is inclusive of a wide range of conduct. The most extensive part of the provision is arguably its inclusion of ‘controlling or coercive behaviour’.[4] Advanced by Evan Stark’s highly influential thesis on ‘The Theory of Coercive Control’[5] and its unwavering support by NGOs such as Women’s Aid,[6] this category was discussed in the recommendations to the Home Office for reform and was included in the definition. The Domestic Abuse Commissioner, Nicole Jacobs, differentiates this category from physical abuse, noting that it ‘often manifests as a recurring pattern of low severity/high harm incidents, rather than as acute high harm/singular incidents’.[7] This definition is crucial in expanding our traditional understanding of domestic abuse, and recognises that it can occur as a pattern of behaviour, which might not be outright identifiable.
Such extensive statutory protection did not always characterise the legal regime; a stark example was the existence of the marital rape exception, which was only abolished in 1991, following the landmark case of R v R.[8] Movements to promote DA protection flourished in the 1990s, encouraging rigorous and extensive legal reform.[9] Since then, DA has been an important aspect of policing with regards to the protection of women and children.[10] In this evolving landscape, a 2012 consultation by the Home Office outlined that 85% of respondents believed that ‘coercive control’ should be part of the DA definition.[11] As indicated above, this majoritarian view was reflected in the statutory formulation, and thus today DA is legally conceived in extensive terms, following the enactment of the DAA 2021.
Nonetheless, statutory expansions are somehow discordant to actual legal protection. Although securing the potential for broad protection, Jacobs has noted that ‘many judges and other professionals in the family justice system did not fully understand domestic abuse, especially coercive control’.[12] This was starkly highlighted in the Re H-N (Children) (Domestic abuse: finding of fact hearings) bundle of cases. [13] In this judgement, the court attempted to affirm the newly incorporated provision of ‘controlling and coercive behaviour’ by recognising that domestic abuse can be a ‘pattern of behaviour’ and not a grand isolated incident.[14] However, in their judgement, the court rather ironically asserted hierarchies of abuse, and warranted protection only to those that fell under the ‘serious’ abuse categories. This reaffirms the concern that, although the statutory regime is expanding, judicial and professional attitudes are still characterised by more narrow definitions.
This is further illustrated by the dissonance between scholarly debate and legal practice. As Herring notes, ‘academics and courts have struggled to agree on domestic violence’.[15] Nonetheless, Michelle Madden Dempsey’s account of DA,[16] has been regarded as a point of reference in the academic sphere, and of persuasive influence. [17]Her conceptualisation of domestic abuse consists of three elements: Violence, Domesticity, and Structural Inequality.Dempsey describes DA as occurring within these three intersecting circles, recognising a range of abuse types, not limited to conventional accounts of ‘traditional legitimist accounts’ which conceptualise DA only in the physical violence sense.[18] The point at which all three intersect, is labelled as the ‘traditional’ account of domestic violence, but Dempsey goes beyond to create a ‘sphere of moral illegitimacy’ where she envisions DA to occur.[19] The figure below provides a visual illustration of the model.
Figure 1: Dempsey’s explanatory model of domestic abuse. Michelle Madden Dempsey, ‘What Counts As Domestic Violence? A Conceptual Analysis’ (2006) Volume 12 William & Mary Journal of Race, Gender, and Social Justice 301, 317.
This conceptual analysis provides a substantive basis for our understanding of domestic violence as a phenomenon with intertwined factors. This is particularly important in challenging traditional legitimist accounts which sanctify domestic abuse, defining it in the narrow context of physical abuse in the home. These narrow, traditional legitimist definitions have been contested by many, including Dempsey[20] and Herring[21], and is reflected in the statutory language in DAA 2021, denoting the intention to expand the scope of DA protection.
In the context of expansion of the statutory DA definition, section 2(1) of DAA 2021 creates the relationship threshold to individuals that are ‘“personally connected” to each other’.[22] This definition is accessible and wide enough to include non-established nor privileged relationships, beyond those mirroring the heteronormative couple, or the nuclear family narrative, which are sanctified in the law.[23] Contrasting this regime, the provision ‘personally connected’ includes people that ‘are, or have been, in an intimate personal relationship with each other’.[24] It is important to note that before the DAA 2021, there was no statutory definition for DA. Regarding the provision of civil remedies in the context of DA, the threshold becomes ‘associated persons’ as defined in Section 62 of the Family Law Act 1996 (FLA 1996).[25]
Reece criticises this expansion, opposing the notion that domestic violence is ubiquitous.[26] Her account seeks to limit the ambit of what qualifies as domestic abuse legally, arguing that the extension to ‘associated persons’ is unjustified, and requires a ‘stronger claim than the mere existence of some number of associated persons in need of protection’.[27] Reece’s primary argument insists on the fundamental structural inequalities that exist between men and women, arguing that the broad DA provisions will dilute the rigour of the law in protecting women. This is partly supported in Dempsey’s argument, which places structural inequalities as one of the three constituents that make up DA.[28] Empirical evidence suggests that indeed, DA is more commonly perpetrated by men, and is often associated with patriarchal ideas.[29] Nevertheless, Reece’s argument falls short in providing evidence for the creation of exclusive categories of DA, and rather points to the need for more inclusive categories. Dempsey, on the contrary, recognises structural inequality as part of domestic abuse but still supports a broader conceptualisation (as seen through her ‘Sphere of Illegitimacy’), which has the underlying aim of protecting a range of victims, while recognising the range of ways in which abuse occurs.
- A Need for Expansion?
- Defining and attributing importance to ‘domesticity’
As mentioned above, to define DA and discuss relevant expansions of the law, we must answer, ‘what makes violence, domestic violence? And specifically, what do we mean by domestic?’.[30] Overall, the definition of ‘domestic’ is far from settled. As earlier conceptions of domestic violence focused on abuse in the context of heteronormative marriage and families[31], the term ‘domestic abuse’ mostly pertained to abuse occurring within the physical space of the home.[32] Indeed, the importance of the ‘home’ is not completely immaterial as it is often understood as symbolic of a ‘place of comfort, safety, and protection’.[33] Using Gardner and Shute’s parallel made in the context of rape, Dempsey argues ‘the symbolic antithesis’ of ‘home as danger’ with ‘home as protection’ creates a ‘moral opposition’ which makes DA damaging on a symbolic level too.[34] Moreover, the space of the home often makes DA particularly hard to monitor, as its physical seclusion creates a “private” sphere, where people’s conduct is protected from external scrutiny.[35]
However, as the regime of DA protection expanded, so did the definition of domestic. Dempsey’s account is significant here. In her delineation of domesticity, she talks of ‘domestic character,’ illustrated in a twofold manner. Firstly, she talks of the ‘Locational’ factor, which aligns with traditional conceptualisations of domestic violence, as ‘violence in the home’.[36] However, Dempsey also recognises that ‘an equally fruitful way to differentiate domestic violence from generic violence’ is the ‘Relationship’ factor, and specifically ‘the nature of the relationship between the parties’.[37] Indeed, ‘the nature of the relationship between the parties is the most common way of differentiating domestic violence from generic violence in US and English law’.[38]
Therefore, we can appreciate that what makes “domestic” violence harmful is not necessarily the space of the home, but rather the vulnerability and intimacy people share. We could argue that the ‘qualities’ of the home are translated into relationships, without the need of a physical structure. Herring, Probert, and Gilmore support this view, arguing that ‘whether the parties are living together or whether they are related is much less relevant than whether their relationship is of the kind where there is trust and vulnerability’.[39] While abuse within the home is particularly damaging because of the moral opposition outlined above, it is the fact that the home is associated with the feelings of comfort and safety, not the mere physical structure of the home, which makes it acutely harmful. This conceptualisation is reflected in the statutory language of section 2(1) DAA 2021, which, as mentioned above, frames DA as occurring between people that are ‘personally connected’ without a requirement for shared residence. [40] This provision warrants legal protection for a range of relationship types and forms, including, uncontroversially, current and former married couples, but also people that are or have been ‘in an intimate personal relationship with each other’.[41]
Therefore, the ‘domestic’ in DA is more about the vulnerability and intimacy people share, rather than the home. ‘Domesticity’ is now associated with comfort, safety, and protection, often supplemented by the existence of a shared home. It is not, however, a prerequisite for the abuse to occur within a house to qualify for protection under the DAA 2021. ‘Domestic abuse’ encapsulates a broader range of relationships, with the key denominator that vulnerability and intimacy are key elements. This change is not necessarily radical or novel, especially following the changes under the DAA 2021 definition, but simply reflects the wider conceptualisation of ‘domesticity’.
- Online Spaces: Expanding the ‘domesticity’ definition.
In our analysis of how domesticity is defined in law, we have argued that the concept is increasingly becoming analogous to intimacy, rather than the physical structure of a home. But can, and if yes, how does this translate in a digital context? More specifically, how can the definition accommodate the changing nature of our social interactions and relationships, considering the rise of the internet?
It is now a widely accepted fact that we live in the Information Age.[42] This phenomenon has led to several social aspects of our lives being regulated by, or within, online spaces.[43] Examples include the creation of ‘social public spaces’[44] and digital ‘social leisure’[45]. Tai Chan has gone beyond to argue that the proliferation of digital platforms has led to the creation of the ‘Digitalised Self,’ which becomes an increasingly accurate representation of our original self in the digital world.[46] By extension, relationships emerge, exist, and/or flourish in digital spaces. Apart from having a ‘Digitalised Self’, Hardesty and Sheredos further argue that we now possess the ability of ‘being together’ without bodily proximity.[47] Therefore, the co-existence of a ‘Digitalised Self’ and the ability of ‘being together’ digitally, have enabled intimacy in terms of relationships flourishing online. By extension, this has shed light on the need to redefine, and expand the scope of protection for domestic abuse.
- Manifestation of Intimate Relationship Abuse in Online Spaces.
As outlined above, the proliferation of digital spaces saw a new, or rather, adapted version of social engagement and connectivity. By extension, intimate relationships, particularly between people that do not live in the same geographical area, are maintained in online spaces.[48] In such cases, since the parties to the relationship are apart (at least on average), there is a relocation of the intimacy aspect of their relationship in the online context. Consistent communication, exchanges regarding their personal lives, as well as plans for potential meeting dates,[49] are common practices for individuals in LDIRs which denote closeness and vulnerability. Therefore, the lack of physical proximity does not signify a lack of intimacy. Parties to the relationship are vulnerable with each other, in line with Hardesty and Sheredos’s conceptualisation of ‘being together’ in the digital world. [50] This vulnerability thus enables the potential for abuse.
NGOs advocating for DA, such as Refuge UK, have noted a sub-category of DA in online spaces, labelling it as ‘Technology Facilitated Abuse,’ or colloquially, ‘Tech Abuse’. Women’s Aid defines tech-abuse as ‘but not limited to, the following behaviours: controlling phone / computer access, breaking communications (tech) equipment, revenge porn, online harassment, or using tech to monitor your location’.[51] Reports by the UK Parliament have also recognised this phenomenon, appreciating it as a serious form of abuse. [52] Empirical evidence supports this, as 1/3 of women in the UK have experienced a form of online abuse.[53] Research also suggests that women and girls are disproportionately more likely to experience online abuse, making Violence Against Women and Girls (VAWG), a pressing issue.[54] The DAA 2021 was said to ‘recognis[e] the issues of tech abuse by “extend[ing] the offence of disclosing private sexual photographs and films with intent to cause distress (known as the “revenge porn” offence) to cover threats to disclose such material’. However, this definition is too narrow to accommodate for the wide-ranging and multilayered manifestation of online DA.
The exponential rise of digitalisation and digital spaces makes this form of abuse more pertinent as we increasingly structure our lives around and in the online world.[55] As put by Hilbert, the digital transformation has established itself with its ‘omnipresent connectedness’, which can consequently heighten the experience of abuse.[56] It would thus be more accurate to assert that Online Domestic Abuse is a species of ‘controlling and coercive behaviour,’ as defined within DAA 2021. We have yet to see the interpretation of this definition manifest into case-law, but the 2023 Statutory Guidance Framework constructs an extensive list of misconduct, which includes the use of ‘digital systems, such as smart devices or social media, to coerce, control, upset and monitor the victim’.[57]
The fact that such misconduct can be abusive, is not a novel development. As early as in 1973, Vaughan v Vaughan established that ‘pestering’ amounted to molestation.[58] Hence, the expansion of the domesticity definition to include this type of conduct, is not a ground-breaking nor new expansion of the law. It must be noted however, that Davies LJ recognised that ‘[w]hether communication amounts to molestation is a question of fact and degree’.[59] While this does not give us prescriptive guidelines as to how to judge this, it does denote that such conduct has the potential of becoming abusive.
As outlined above, a major challenge with monitoring and dealing with DA in the context of the home, is its privacy and seclusion from external scrutiny.[60] A similar challenge emerges in the online context, as the monitoring ofdigital spaces is challenging, especially as abusers expand their ‘spatial and temporal control’ with the use of digital technologies.[61] Paradigmatically, Refuge’s research has indicated that 52% of victims of tech-abuse felt that social media platforms handled the complaints ‘badly’.[62]
It is thus clear that the current state of the law concerning online DA, is presented in a piecemeal and fragmented manner. It is thus important to address this issue holistically, with prescriptive, yet wide definitions, to ensure the protection of victims.
- Moving forward: Reforming the Legal Trajectory
Despite attempts by parliamentary committees[63] and NGOs[64] to integrate online abuse in statutory provisions, this type of domestic violence remains unaddressed in an explicit manner. Firstly, there is no explicit definition for online harassment in English law. Under Section 1 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 there is a general prohibition of harassment.[65] Moreover, under Section 1(1)(a) of the Malicious Communications Act 1998, sending messages which are ‘indecent or grossly offensive’ is also prohibited.[66]
Nonetheless, various issues arise with these provisions. Firstly, the lack of an explicit ban on online harassment makes attempts at redress unclear and potentially inaccessible to victims. Secondly, this fragmented and piecemeal way of addressing online abuse creates significant gaps in legislation. Thirdly, the lack of a specialised online harassment provision fails to recognise the ‘omnipresent connectedness’ that online spaces create, and thus the ubiquitousness of such abuse.[67] As a result, the shortcomings of the law were starkly highlighted during the COVID-19 pandemic, when incidents of online abuse skyrocketed.[68] Lastly, an overarching problem remains; even if online abuse is addressed through a statutory definition, it would still fall short from recognising online domestic abuse. While NGOs recognise it as a form of serious abuse, political debates and policy making still hesitate to classify cases of online domestic abuse as such.
The new Online Safety Bill, now Online Safety Act 2023 (OSA 2023), could have dealt with the issue of fragmented legislation in relation to online abuse, and be an effective avenue to tackle online domestic abuse. Yet, at its early stages, the OSA 2023 had no mention of VAWG in its 225 pages of text.[69] Following demands from pressure-groups such as Refuge UK[70] and End Violence Against Women[71], the Act was enacted with provisions regarding harm prevention and education with regards to mediation of VAWG. The exact action plan is still to be developed by Ofcom. Therefore, while statutory provisions do indicate the need to address the issue of online abuse, the lack of explicit directions generates uncertainty. NGOs such as Refuge have pledged to support Ofcom in their materialisation of guidelines, yet the organisations have not indicated what type of actions they are aiming to take.[72] More significantly, another problem is that the mediation of VAWG does not exactly capture the essence and problems associated with online domestic abuse, such as a relationship of intimacy and closeness, which makes the abuse more pertinent, and ‘omnipresent’.
Currently, under the Family Law Act 1996 (FLA 1996) there are two civil remedies for domestic abuse in the UK: non-molestation[73] and occupation orders[74]. The latter is not entirely relevant in this context, as it concerns the occupation of a home, whereas we are mostly concerned with individuals that have a degree of physical separation. The current alternatives are non-molestation orders, which generally prohibit abusers from engaging with the victim(s). Their potential enforcement in an online context is arguably more challenging than in the physical world. The control of communication between individuals online is not easily hampered; many perpetrators can contact their victims even after being blocked, making post-separation abuse even more pertinent than that in the physical world. Thus, a specialised order, or an adaptation of the order, to fit the digital framework is needed.
The current regime places a big proportion of the burden on victims, urging them to self-protect, examples include encouraging victims of abuse to secure their devices and accounts, to keep their location hidden, and to “audit” their personal social media.[75] While such practices can help mediate issues short-term, they do not tackle the root of abuse, nor provide a sufficient layer of support.
What is thus important, is for support to come from the platforms that people communicate through. The OSA 2023 sets out a wide range of duties for providers of user-to-user services, which are defined as ‘services … [where the content] is generated directly on the service’.[76] An important feature of the Act is the duties it sets out regarding risk-assessments.[77] Those require providers to conduct illegal content risk assessments, which are considered ‘priority offences’.[78] While some forms of abuse could fall under the definitions of ‘harassment‘,[79] it is unclear whether ‘coercive or controlling’ behaviour falls under these definitions. There is a powerful incentive for the risk-assessment guidelines to include the monitoring of content that could amount to ‘controlling and coercive behaviour’, and more widely DA, ensuring victims’ protection is not merely self-reliant. However, this is just one method of protection, which does not necessarily catch all instances of DA.
Therefore, as the trajectory and extent of protection depends on Ofcom’s guidelines, it is imperative that specialised attention is devoted to online DA. Summarising the problems delineated above, legislation in this area needs to create specialised definitions for online domestic abuse which recognise it as a ‘real’ form of abuse, but also encapsulate its distinctive form; namely the fact that it can be omnipresent, difficult to monitor, and accentuated by access to personal information online. In short, a tailored legal framework which considers the nuances, technicalities, and distinctiveness of online domestic abuse, is necessary for the comprehensive protection of victims.
- Conclusion
In conclusion, this article has examined the landscape of DA in the context of digitalisation focusing on the emerging issue of tech-abuse, particularly in the context of LDIRs. Analysis of the DAA 2021 has indicated a trend towards a broad framework for protection, extending the definition of ‘domestic’ beyond the physical spaces to account for the evolving manifestations and dynamics of personal relationships.
The need for expansion becomes evident when we consider the transformative impact of digital spaces on our lives. As Dempsey argued, the concept of ‘domesticity’ is no longer confined to physical homes but extends to online realms where individuals cultivate intimate relationships. This is accentuated by Tai Chan’s ‘Digitalised Self’ phenomenon and Hardesty and Sheredos argument of ‘being together’ in online spaces. From an empirical perspective, particularly post-COVID-19, the rise of abuse in the online context underscores the urgency to adapt legal frameworks to safeguard victims in the digital sphere.
Moving forward, the enactment of OSA 2023 marks a step towards acknowledging the digital dimension of DA. Nonetheless, the lack of explicit provisions raises concerns, necessitating clarity in the upcoming actions to be taken by Ofcom. As digital spaces continue shaping our interactions, it is necessary that Ofcom guidance is developed in a way in which victims of DA are protected sufficiently.
To summarise, the redefinition of legal protection in the digital age requires a comprehensive approach that considers the complexities of online domestic abuse. Bridging the gap between legal frameworks, sociological research, as well as technological advancements is imperative to ensure the safety and protection of victims in the nascent, yet demanding landscape of online domestic abuse.
[1] Jonathan Herring, Rebecca Probert, Stephen Gilmore, Great Debates in Family Law ((2nd edn, Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2015) 229.
[2] Herring et al (n1) 219.
[3] s 1.
[4] ibid s 1(3)(c).
[5] Evan Stark, ‘Coercive Control: How Men Entrap Women in Personal Life’ (2007, Oxford University Press), Ch.7 (‘The Theory of Coercive Control’) 198-227.
[6] Women’s Aid, ‘What is coercive control?’ (Women’s Aid, 2019) <https://www.womensaid.org.uk/information-support/what-is-domestic-abuse/coercive-control/> accessed 2 January 2024.
[7] Home Office, Domestic Abuse Commissioner, ‘The Family Court and domestic abuse: achieving cultural change’ (17 July 2023) 14.
[8] R v R [1991] UKHL 12.
[9] Centre for Women’s Justice ‘Timeline of Key Legal Developments’ (Centre for Women’s Justice, 2022) < https://www.centreforwomensjustice.org.uk/timeline> accessed 2 January 2024.
[10] Evan Stark (n5); DAA 2021, s 3.
[11] Home Office, ‘Cross-Government Definition Of Domestic Violence – A Consultation Summary Of Responses’ (Home Office, 2012) 3.
[12] Home Office (n 7).
[13] Re H-N (Children) (Domestic abuse: finding of fact hearings) [2021] EWCA Civ 448 (“Re H-N”).
[14] Re H-N (n 13), para 25.
[15] Jonathan Herring, ‘Relational Autonomy and Family Law’ (1st edn, Springer Cham, 2014) 51.
[16] Michelle Madden Dempsey, ‘What Counts As Domestic Violence? A Conceptual Analysis’ (2006) Volume 12 William & Mary Journal of Race, Gender, and Social Justice 301-333.
[17] Dempsey’s piece has been cited in multiple publications, including: Susan B. Sorenson, Laura Sinko, and Richard A. Berk, ‘The Endemic Amid the Pandemic: Seeking Help for Violence Against Women in the Initial Phases of COVID-19’ (2021) 36 J Interpers Violence 9, 10.
[18] Dempsey (n 16) 317.
[19] Dempsey (n 16) 316.
[20] ibid 309.
[21] Herring et al (n1) 220.
[22] DAA 2021, s 2.
[23] For a more extensive academic discussion on this, see: Rob George, Sharon Thompson, and Joanna Miles, ‘Family Relationships Between Adults’ in Rob George, Sharon Thompson, and Joanna Miles (eds.), Family Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (5th edn, OUP 2023) 111; Sharon Shakargy, ‘Plus One: Who Decides Who is One’s Significant Other?’ (2021) 35(1) International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family ebab017.); And in case-law: Crake v Supplementary Benefits Commission [1982] 1 All ER 498, 505; Hyde v Hyde and Woodmansee (1866) L.R. 1 P. & D. 130, 133.
[24] DAA 2021, s 2 (1) (e).
[25] Family Law Act 1996 (“FLA 1996”) s 62.
[26] Helen Reece, ‘The End of Domestic Violence’ (2006) 69(5) Modern Law Review, 770-791.
[27] ibid 773.
[28] Dempsey (n 16) 314.
[29] Paul J Fleming, Sofia Gruskin, Florencio Rojo, Shari L. Dworkin, ‘Men’s violence against women and men are inter-related: Recommendations for simultaneous intervention’ (2015) 146 Social Science & Medicine 249-56.
[30] Herring et al (n1) 229.
[31] The first conceptualisations of DA emerged after R v R [1991] UKHL 12 (Herring et al (n 1)) and were understood as occurring in the heteronormative marriage, perpetrated by the husband against the wife.
[32] Dempsey (n 16) 312.
[33] Dempsey (n 16) 313.
[34] ibid.
[35] T O’Donovan, ‘Sexual Divisions in the Law (Law in Context)’ (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985) 190, 194.
[36] Richard J. Gelles, ‘Family Violence’ (1985) 11 Annual Review of Sociology 347, 348.
[37] Dempsey (n 16) 313.
[38] To bring out this claim, Dempsey (n 16) 313 makes reference to: Roger Bird, Domestic violence: Law and Practice (4th ed. 2003) (discussing the concept of association as an element of domestic violence in English civil law); Nancy Kid. Lemon, Domestic Violence Law 725 (2001) (quoting Victoria F. Nourse, Where Violence, Relationship,and EqualityMeet: The Violence Against Women Act’s CivilRights Remedy, 11 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1 (1996)).
[39] Herring et al (n1) 230.
[40] DAA [2021] s 2(1).
[41] ibid.
[42] Manuel Castells, ‘An Introduction to the Information Age’ (1997) 2(7) City, 6.
[43] Guess Lindemann, David Schünemann, ‘Presence in Digital Spaces. A Phenomenological Concept of Presence in Mediatized Communication’ (2020) 43 Human Studies, 627-651.
[44] Ayat Ayman Abdel-Aziz, Hassan Abdel-Salam, Zeyad El-Sayad ‘The role of ICTs in creating the new social public place of the digital era’ (2016) 55 (1) Alexandria Engineering Journal, 497, 488.
[45] Rojas de Francisco, Laura & López-Sintas, Jordi & Álvarez Ercilia, ‘Social leisure in the digital age’ (2016) 39 Loisir et Société / Society and Leisure 258-27.
[46] Kai Tai Chan, ‘Emergence of the ‘Digitalized Self’ in the Age of Digitalization’ (2022) 6 Computers in Human Behaviour Reports.
[47] Rebecca A. Hardesty & Ben Sheredos, ‘Being together, worlds apart: A virtual-worldly phenomenology’ (2019) 42(3) Human Studies 343-370.
[48] Henrietta Leonie Pilny & Florian U. Siems, ‘Maintenance Strategies and Long-Distance Relationships: An Adaption of Theories from Interpersonal Relationship Research to Marketing, Journal of Relationship Marketing’ (2019) 18(4), 309-323.
[49] ibid.
[50] Hardesty & Sheredos (n 47).
[51]Women’s Aid ‘Technology and domestic abuse: Experiences of survivors during the Covid 19 pandemic’ (Women’s Aid, 2022) <https://www.womensaid.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/4.-Technology-domestic-abuse-and-Covid-19-1.pdf> accessed 7 January 2024.
[52] Lorna Christie and Susie Wright, ‘Rapid Response: Technology and Domestic Abuse’ (UK Parliament, 13 November 2020) < https://post.parliament.uk/technology-and-domestic-abuse/> accessed 9 January 2023.
[53] Online Safety Bill Report ‘Unsocial Spaces’ (Refuge, October 2021) <https://refuge.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/unsocial-spaces-.pdf> accessed 15 March 2024.
[54] ibid.
[55] Tai Chan (n 46).
[56] Martin Hilbert, ‘Digital technology and social change: The Digital Transformation of Society from a Historical Perspective (2020) 22(2) Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience 189-194.
[57] Home Office, ‘Controlling or Coercive Behaviour: Statutory Guidance Framework’ (5 April 2023) <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/642d3f9e7de82b001231364d/Controlling_or_Coercive_Behaviour_Statutory_Guidance_-_final.pdf> accessed 15 March 2024
[58] Vaughan v Vaughan [1973] 1 WLR 1159.
[59] ibid.
[60] Dempsey (n 16) 312.
[61] Dana Cuomo, Natalie Dolci, ‘New tools, old abuse: Technology-Enabled Coercive Control’ (TECC), (2021) 126 Geoforum 224.
[62] Refuge (n 53).
[63] Home Affairs Committee, ‘Violence against women and girls’ (House of Commons, Grimond room 21 June 2021) <https://parliamentlive.tv/Event/Index/26bbb86c-9e48-434f-b4af-d65042fdd6fa> accessed 11 March 2024.
[64] Refuge UK, ‘Refuge launches #MarkedAsUnsafe campaign to combat online abuse’ (Refuge UK, 11 October 2022) <https://refuge.org.uk/news/refuge-launches-markedasunsafe-campaign-to-combat-online-abuse/> accessed 11 March 2024.
[65] Protection from Harassment Act 1997, s 1.
[66] Malicious Communications Act 1998, s (1a).
[67] Martin Hilbert ‘Digital technology and social change: The Digital Transformation of Society from a Historical Perspective (2020) 22(2) Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience 189-194.
[68] Refuge (n 64).
[69] Sinead Geoghegan, ‘Online Safety Bill becomes law with guidance to protect women and girls’ (End Violence Against Women, 26 October 2023) <https://www.endviolenceagainstwomen.org.uk/online-safety-bill-becomes-law-with-guidance-to-protect-women-and-girls/> accessed 10 January 2024.
[70] Jess Eagleton, ‘The Online Safety Bill – what does it mean for women and girls?’ (Refuge, 2023) <https://refuge.org.uk/news/the-online-safety-bill-what-does-it-mean-for-women-and-girls/> accessed 10 January 2024.
[71] Geoghegan (n 69).
[72] Eagleton (n 70).
[73] FLA 1996 (n 25) s 42–42A.
[74] ibid s 33-41.
[75] Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, ‘A Guide to managing Online & Offline Abuse’ (CPA, 2022) <https://www.uk-cpa.org/media/4633/a-guide-to-managing-online-offline-abuse_compressed.pdf> accessed 30 January 2024.
[76] Online Safety Act (2023) s 3(1).
[77] Online Safety Act (2023) s 9.
[78] These ‘priority offences’ are defined under the Online Safety Act (2023) Schedule 7.
[79] Online Safety Act (2023) Schedule 7, s 4.
Eleni Anayiotou
LLB Law (LSE) ’25 and Notes Editor of the LSE Law Review Editorial Board 2023-24
An insightful piece on how online domestic abuse is reshaping legal frameworks. It’s crucial to adapt laws to protect victims in long-distance relationships, ensuring justice and safety for all.
Glad you found it insightful!