Greenwashing is defined as the behaviour of an organisation in portraying that they are doing more to protect the environment than they are in reality.[1] Given the growing awareness surrounding climate change and environmental issues, companies are increasingly highlighting their efforts in contributing to environmental solutions, leading to potential concerns of greenwashing. The UK government has responded by introducing regulatory measures such as enforcement action and disclosure-based regulation with ambitious claims to adequately tackle greenwashing. This article recognises that these measures are a step in the right direction, given that existing efforts have proven insufficient to tackle greenwashing on its own. However, it will be further argued that the government is essentially engaging in a greenwashing of its own, by representing that it is tackling greenwashing despite the inability of the current regulatory system to comprehensively combat the large-scale and pervasive nature of the problem.
1. Greenwashing as a Problem
The role of corporations in society is constantly evolving, gradually shifting from being viewed as profit-making vehicles to organisations that also make active, positive societal contributions.[2] Specifically, there has been increased scrutiny into how corporations are tackling environmental concerns given the growing urgency of combatting climate change, which has resulted in an increasing number of corporations placing greater focus on aligning their organisational goals, or refining their products, to tackle these issues. This can be demonstrated by a combination of methods that incorporate sustainability goals, including the effectiveness of advertising as a ‘green’ company to reach out to an increasingly environmentally conscious consumer base,[3] facilitating financing given the rise of socially responsible investing,[4] alleviating stakeholder concerns, and recognising environmental issues as material risks to the long-term profitability of the company.[5]
All of this is positive at first glance, especially if corporations are acting for the benefit of society while simultaneously benefitting from increased profitability. However, the reality is that the alignment of organisational aims with environmentally conscious objectives often either requires significant costs for corporations or generates lower returns as opposed to disregarding the negative externalities imposed on the environment.[6] This is a trade-off that is inconsistent with a company’s profit-oriented approach. This has led to the prevalence of greenwashing as corporations recognise that branding themselves or their products as ‘green’ serves as a low-cost public relations exercise with positive marketing benefits,[7] without requiring significant investment in tangible improvements to fundamentally change corporate behaviour. Corporate greenwashing includes greenwashing at an organisational level or regarding specific products and services and takes on a myriad of forms, ranging from explicit false statements to more subtle strategies, such as only highlighting a firm’s positive actions to draw attention away from its negative ones.[8]
The prevalence of greenwashing is concerning for two reasons. Beyond companies unfairly profiting from greenwashing, the limited repercussions for doing so, as evidenced by its proliferation, increase the incentives for more companies to engage in the practice. Furthermore, the pervasiveness of greenwashing can potentially undermine any real push for change by presenting a façade of progress where there is none. For example, greenwashing has contributed to increased consumer scepticism towards claims made by corporate actors as to the sustainability-promoting effects of their strategies,[9] shifting the spotlight away from actual attempts to promote green solutions. It is thus clear that greenwashing is a problem that must be addressed.
2. Existing Non-governmental Efforts in Tackling Greenwashing
Current environment-related corporate governance
Traditionally, UK government intervention in corporate activity has been characterised as the mitigation of the ‘worst excesses’ of corporate behaviour,[10] with otherwise minimal government intervention in corporate affairs,[11] to create a ‘business friendly’ environment.[12] Companies operate on the basis of ‘enlightened shareholder value’,[13] where corporate management primarily acts in the interests of shareholders (i.e., is profit-driven) while also having regard to other stakeholder interests, including the environment. Notably, however, stakeholder interests are subordinate to those of shareholders.[14] Given this model of corporate governance, the government has suggested that company law is not the appropriate mechanism to tackle environmental issues, as evidenced in parliamentary debates suggesting that a required minimum standard of consideration of the environment by company directors would merely lead to ‘complying with the letter, rather than with the spirit’ of environmental protection.[15]
As a result, corporate governance on environmental matters has primarily been undertaken by private actors and civil society, through what has been described as a ‘decentred’[16] or self-regulation approach.[17] First, civil actors such as the media and Non-Governmental Organisations (‘NGOs’) play a strong role through stakeholder governance[18] by publicly highlighting and campaigning against instances of greenwashing to force changes in corporate behaviour, such as the successful campaign against Volkswagen by Greenpeace.[19] Second, private actors may invoke common law mechanisms such as the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation to raise greenwashing concerns.[20] Third, private standard-setting bodies offer certification systems or sector-specific accreditation on a product or firm’s environmental standards, offering an external form of verification to companies’ claims.
Proponents of the current model of environmental governance point to the UK’s leading role in Corporate Social Responsibility development and uptake.[21] This can be attributed to its relative effectiveness compared to traditional prescriptive models of regulation and restrictive legal controls,[22] which were critiqued as being costly and ineffective while hindering innovation and business efficiency.[23] By contrast, decentred regulatory systems — as in the UK — are sufficiently agile to contextualise the myriad of changing business factors, [24] such as sector specific environmental considerations, and the costs of regulation that are borne by non-governmental actors.
Why is governmental regulation required to tackle greenwashing?
Despite these positive benefits, this essay argues that a decentred approach alone is woefully inadequate in dealing with greenwashing due to the inconsistency of enforcement in the absence of governmental regulation. First, this can be attributed to the inadequacy of available mechanisms to tackle the expansive forms of greenwashing. While NGOs have successfully highlighted the more egregious instances of greenwashing, they are practically restricted by the number of issues they can spotlight. This is due to factors such as the potential dilution of the impact of their activism should more cases be brought to public attention,[25] and operational limitations in carrying out the resource-intensive scrutiny of companies. Furthermore, the exercise of data gathering to identify instances of greenwashing relies significantly on voluntary public disclosures, wherein companies may provide incomplete or insufficient datasets due to their discretionary nature. There is, therefore, a clear need for government regulation in the form of standardising and mandating disclosures to facilitate this form of civil regulation, which the government has attempted to implement to a degree through its introduction of disclosure-based regulation, as discussed in Section 3.
Second, due to the costly nature of litigation, private actors are unlikely to bring greenwashing claims, unless they are motivated by external factors. For example, the tort claim regarding greenwashing in Churchill Gowns was only raised as part of a broader defence in competition-focused litigation, and the finding of fraudulent misrepresentation due to greenwashing had no bearing on the actual judgment.[26] Furthermore, companies which engage in greenwashing are also unlikely to be incentivised to bring claims against others, given the risk of them being held liable for engaging in the practice themselves. Therefore, government regulation in the form of an established regulator would be better positioned to monitor and enforce against greenwashing cases.
Third, it is argued that rather than preventing instances of greenwashing, standard-setting bodies provide a further avenue for companies to advance greenwashing claims. As suggested by Parkinson, companies may join standard-setting bodies to create an appearance of regulation to limit state involvement[27] while themselves continuing to engage in greenwashing. For example, ISO 14001 provides environmental management certification,[28] but there is little evidence that certified corporations produce better environmental performance than their peers.[29] This can be attributed to the standard’s self-reporting nature and the absence of a comprehensive inspection scheme, effectively rendering the standard as another voluntary mechanism with limited repercussions for false reporting. Furthermore, even if more stringent forms of independent accreditation are created, there is little incentive for companies to adopt such certification if compliance necessitates a significant negative impact on the firm’s profitability. A prime example is the Forest Stewardship Council (‘FSC’) that provides timber certification and receives strong industry support, evidenced by the strong demand for FSC-certified products.[30] Despite this, most suppliers have chosen to adopt their own certification systems that are significantly less stringent and costly, with less than 14% of global timber products linked to FSC certification.[31] This highlights the inherent limitation of standard-setting bodies as voluntary certification regimes. This hinders their ability to act as a sufficiently strong counterbalance against the profit-driven incentives of corporations, when engaging in greenwashing is more profitable than an organisational overhaul of current operations. Therefore, stronger action needs to be taken in the form of regulation to properly counteract the incentives for a company to greenwash.
3. Analysing the Current UK Regulation Tackling Greenwashing
The need for government regulation to complement existing non-governmental forms of regulation and oversee enforcement mechanisms is apparent given these concerns. The government has committed to taking steps to address greenwashing through utilising direct enforcement mechanisms and introducing disclosure-based regulation. Still, this essay argues that, although these measures are a step in the right direction, the current measures available are insufficient to deal with the pervasiveness of greenwashing.
Direct enforcement
Greenwashing is directly tackled in the context of consumer protection, due to legislation prohibiting misleading actions in commercial practice.[32] The Competitions and Markets Authority (‘CMA’) therefore created a Green Claims Code as practical guidance to businesses on greenwashing,[33] marketed as part of a broader government effort against greenwashing ahead of COP26,[34] and signalled the CMA’s focus on tackling greenwashing. Subsequently, the CMA launched investigations into Boohoo, Asda, and ASOS for potential greenwashing claims after a year-long examination of the fashion sector,[35] and plans to review other pertinent consumer sectors.[36]
Despite these efforts by the CMA, this article argues that its current powers are insufficient to deal with the scope of greenwashing even within the narrow ambit of consumer protection. Current investigations have proven to be significantly resource-intensive, as evidenced by the CMA’s focus on one consumer sector at a time and further investigations only on three companies. This is compounded by the CMA’s investigation of greenwashing within the overall business practices of a company and its desire to create sector-specific guidance on greenwashing.[37] This, as a result, limits the regulatory support that it can receive from other authorities in policing greenwashing such as sectoral regulators like Ofgem or agencies like the Advertising Standards Agency, which only regulates print and broadcast advertising campaigns. Given these resource constraints, it is plausible to assume that the CMA will only be able to oversee certain key sectors, highlighting its inability to adequately investigate the extent of greenwashing across corporations. Furthermore, due to the long timeframe coupled with the singular sectoral focus of investigations, companies in a previously investigated sector may have since engaged in new forms of greenwashing that could escape CMA scrutiny. As such, any investigations undertaken by the CMA appear to be for the purpose of standard-setting within sectors rather than eradicating greenwashing, and any enforcement action restricted to only a few corporations.
Some may point to the deterrent effect of employing enforcement measures against even one company due to the increased effectiveness of decentred regulation, given a viable threat of government sanction.[38] However, this essay argues that the deterrence effect is limited at best due to the CMA’s restricted enforcement powers, rendering it insufficient to counterbalance profit-driven incentives to greenwash. This is because the CMA’s strongest enforcement action is obtaining a court order to impose obligations on the company, which is a resource-intensive endeavour often not utilised in favour of agreeing to undertakings from the corporations.[39] This potentially runs the risk of companies continuing their errant behaviour for an extended period, especially in the case of greenwashing where companies directly benefit from continuing to engage in the practice. Already, in other consumer protection cases, such as CMA’s action against Facebook for misleading reviews, Facebook was only found after subsequent investigations not to have sufficiently complied with its undertaking, resulting in the matter taking over 2 years to be resolved.[40] It is, therefore, argued that the CMA should be granted greater powers to directly enforce against companies without requiring an application to the court, and impose penalty fines for breaches of undertakings. These will allow greenwashing cases to be swiftly dealt with and deter against delays in compliance. As of April 2023, the government is debating these measures under the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill.[41] Still, this essay further argues that it is insufficient merely for these powers to be introduced, but that the CMA must also demonstrate a commitment to exercising them against greenwashing to act as an effective deterrent given the pervasiveness of the problem. This is best illustrated by Canada’s Competition Bureau $3 million fine against a company for false recycling claims.[42] It has therefore been established that the current enforcement powers of the CMA are inadequate to deal with the expansive scope of greenwashing and too limited to act as an effective deterrent.
Disclosure-based regulation
Apart from direct enforcement, disclosure-based regulation offers another opportunity to tackle the problem of greenwashing. This is through bolstering existing forms of civil regulation by providing public access to previously undisclosed environmental information[43] to enhance existing self-regulation mechanisms, as well as engaging existing corporate governance mechanisms. The UK government has recently introduced climate-related financial disclosures as part of its Net Zero Strategy,[44] with one of its aims being to tackle greenwashing.[45]
i. Existing regulation
Current disclosure-based regulations include reporting requirements for pension funds[46] to include climate-related risk. Recently, the climate-related financial disclosure regulations[47] for large companies have also been introduced, with a view to extending this fully across the economy.[48] While these regulations are not specifically designed to tackle greenwashing, they can be potentially useful in addressing greenwashing concerns. However, as will be illustrated, their efficacy in tackling greenwashing is limited at best.
First, these disclosures could lead to the continued development and refinement of ‘environment, social, governance’ (‘ESG’) criteria, a framework for investors to assess a company’s sustainability,[49] which can be beneficial to the identification, sanctioning, and deterrence of greenwashing. The development of ESG can be attributed to, first, increased access to a company’s environmental information due to the mandatory disclosure requirements. Second, these disclosure requirements frame environmental issues as a form of financial risk, allowing investors to better integrate ESG factors into their investment decisions. This allows for more cases of greenwashing to be identified, given that the reporting requirements for investors, such as those in respect of pension funds, on its management of climate risk necessitates close scrutiny of the ESG credentials of their investments, including whether these credentials have been properly represented. Furthermore, pension funds have significant influence over market practices through their investment policies due to their substantial wealth,[50] and, therefore, undertaking such scrutiny into their investments may potentially deter companies from greenwashing, since doing so risks limiting their access to financing. Still, the extent to which disclosure-based regulation can effectively tackle greenwashing is restricted due to the leeway granted to companies in selecting and presenting the information reported. [51] For example, an evaluation of the disclosure regulations under the listing rules, the precursor to the climate-related financial disclosure regulations, found evidence of companies indicating compliance with the disclosure regime when the disclosures were insufficiently precise and limited in content.[52]
Second, disclosure-based regulations tie in generally with the existing corporate governance system, potentially allowing companies to be held liable for greenwashing using existing statutory mechanisms. For example, the climate-related financial disclosure regulations have been drafted so as to allow the disclosures to be used to assess the performance of directors’ duties,[53] which include promoting the success of the company in consideration of its impact on the environment.[54] This allows shareholders to bring derivative actions against directors for greenwashing instances at a board level on the basis of a breach of duty,[55] such as in the claim currently being advanced by ClientEarth against Shell’s Board of Directors.[56] However, despite the theoretical ability to utilise these corporate governance mechanisms, their impact is likely to be limited in practice. Shareholder action in the form of derivative claims or other statutory mechanisms,[57] while available, has been historically underutilised due to the high evidentiary hurdles in proving causation of a specific loss and the courts’ general reluctance to adjudicate on the subjective basis of commercial decisions.[58] As such, this suggests that corporate governance mechanisms are unlikely to play a key role in tackling the expansive scope of greenwashing, but may serve a normative purpose[59] when combined with broader market developments, as highlighted above.
ii. Proposed regulation
Fortunately, this essay believes that the government’s proposed regulation can serve to overcome the limitations in existing regulation. Notably, this includes the Sustainability Disclosure Requirements (‘SDR’) with a proposed ‘anti-greenwashing’ rule for firms under the ambit of the Financial Conduct Authority, and the UK Green Taxonomy, which requires companies to report against clear, science-backed criteria as to what constitutes environmentally sustainable activity.[60]
Overall, these proposals represent the most targeted form of anti-greenwashing regulation introduced thus far, providing strong signalling effects as to the government’s stance against the practice. Additionally, the SDR are specifically beneficial due to civil action traditionally targeting greenwashing by consumer-facing companies,[61] as opposed to less visible sectors such as the financial industry. Likewise, the UK Green Taxonomy complements existing disclosure-based regulations by ensuring standardisation in the mandatory reports, allowing for more direct comparison between companies and thereby reducing opportunities for greenwashing in these disclosures.
However, these proposals are also not without limitations. Despite the existence of an EU Taxonomy and Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation, on which the UK Green Taxonomy and SDR are built upon, greenwashing concerns remain prevalent in the EU due to the broad definitions utilised in the stricter disclosure requirements to allow it to be applicable generally. This risks companies being able to find opportunities to engage in greenwashing within the new regime,[62] highlighting the nature of greenwashing as an endemic issue, with new forms of greenwashing likely to be adopted by companies despite strident regulatory efforts. Furthermore, it is of concern that legislating for the Taxonomy has been delayed due to the complexity involved in creating it as well as external political events impacting the UK Parliament.[63] The current Financial Services and Markets Bill is, at the time of writing, in its last stages of debate, which, if enacted, would repeal retained EU law in respect of current EU Taxonomy regulation.[64] Without a clear timeline as to when the UK Taxonomy will be introduced, any further substantial delay limits the effectiveness of other forms of government regulation and could additionally contribute to further greenwashing due to the current period of regulatory uncertainty.
4. Conclusion
It has been established that greenwashing is a pervasive issue that cannot be addressed solely through corporate governance. Despite the government’s claims to be tackling greenwashing, current efforts by the CMA and the introduction of disclosure-based regulation fall short of effectively addressing this pervasive issue. This essay has argued that much more needs to be done to tackle greenwashing, namely in the form of granting increased enforcement powers to the CMA, as well as prioritising the delivery of the regulatory mechanisms underlined in the government’s roadmap, namely the SDR and UK Green Taxonomy. While it can be argued that greenwashing is fundamentally an endemic issue, with new forms of greenwashing likely to appear as others are prevented, it is necessary that the government tackle the issue in line with its previously stated commitments to create an effective arsenal of decentred regulation against greenwashing. Otherwise, the current state of UK government anti-greenwashing regulation is akin to a greenwashing exercise on its own, limiting the extent to which meaningful change is occurring within UK companies to protect the environment.
[1] ‘Greenwashing’, Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (4th edn, Cambridge University Press 2013).
[2] Menno DeJong and others, ‘Making Green Stuff? Effects of Corporate Greenwashing on Consumers’ (2018) 32(1) Journal of Business and Technical Communication 77.
[3] Catherine Ramus and Ivan Montiel, ‘When are Corporate Environmental Policies a Form of Greenwashing?’ (2005) 44(4) Business & Society377.
[4] Yannik Bofinger, Kim Heyden, and Björn Rock, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility and Market Efficiency: Evidence from ESG and Misvaluation Measures’ (2022) 134 Journal of Banking & Finance <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378426621002739> accessed 1 May 2023.
[5] Mette Morsing and Majken Schultz, ‘Corporate social responsibility communication: stakeholder information, response and involvement strategies’ (2006) 15(4) Journal of Business Ethics323.
[6] Lisa Benjamin, Companies and Climate Change: Theory and Law in the United Kingdom (Cambridge University Press 2021) ch 7-8.
[7] John Parkinson, ‘Disclosure and Corporate and Social Environmental Performance: Competitiveness and Enterprise in a Broader Social Frame’ (2003) 3(1) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 3.
[8] DeJong (n 2).
[9] Dionysis Skarmeas and Constantinos Leonidou, ‘When consumers doubt, Watch out! The role of CSR skepticism’ (2013) 66(10) Journal of Business Research 1831.
[10] Benjamin Richardson and Beate Sjåfjell (eds), Company Law and Sustainability: Legal Barriers and Opportunities (Cambridge University Press 2015) p 13.
[11] Andrew Keay and Michelle Welsh, ‘Enforcing Breaches of Directors’ Duties by a Public Body and Antipodean Experiences’ (2015) 15(2) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 255.
[12] Parkinson (n 7).
[13] David Millon, ‘Corporate social responsibility and environmental sustainability’ in Richardson (n 10).
[14] R (on the application of People & Planet)v HM Treasury [2009] EWHC 3020 (Admin).
[15] Benjamin (n 6) p 48.
[16] Richardson and Sjåfjell (n 10) p 16.
[17] Financial Reporting Council, The UK Corporate Governance Code, 2018.
[18] William Laufer, ‘Social Accountability and Corporate Greenwashing’ (2003) 43(3) Journal of Business Ethics253.
[19] John Still, ‘Five Greenpeace campaigns against companies: Lego, Barbie and Shell’ The Guardian (7 August 2014) <https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/blog/greenpeace-campaigns-companies-lego-mattel-barbie-shell> accessed 1 May 2023.
[20] An example being Churchill Gowns v Ede & Ravenscroft [2022] CAT 34.
[21] David Vogel, The Market for Virtue. The Potential and Limits of Corporate Social Responsibility (Brookings Institution Press 2005)
[22] Cass Sunstein, ‘Paradoxes of the regulatory state’ (1990) 57(2) University of Chicago Law Review 407.
[23] Bruce Ackerman and Richard Stewart, ‘Reforming environmental law’ (1985) 37 Stanford Law Review 1333.
[24] Julia Black, ‘Decentring regulation: understanding the role of regulation and self-regulation in a “post-regulatory world”’ (2001) 54(1) Current Legal Problems 103.
[25] Vogel (n 21).
[26] Churchill (n 20).
[27] Parkinson (n 7).
[28] ISO, ‘ISO 14001’ <https://www.iso.org/iso-14001-environmental-management.html> accessed 1 May 2023.
[29] Vogel (n 21).
[30] WWF, ‘World’s largest print run now carries FSC label’ (3 October 2014) <https://wwf.panda.org/wwf_news/?230291/Worlds-largest-print-run-now-carries-FSC-label> accessed 1 May 2023.
[31] ibid.
[32] Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008.
[33] CMA, ‘Making environmental claims on goods and services’ (CMA, 20 September 2021) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/green-claims-code-making-environmental-claims/environmental-claims-on-goods-and-services> accessed 1 April 2024.
[34] CMA, ‘Greenwashing: CMA puts businesses on notice’ (CMA, 20 September 2021) <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/greenwashing-cma-puts-businesses-on-notice> accessed 1 May 2023.
[35] CMA, ‘ASOS, Boohoo and Asda investigated over fashion “green” claims’ (CMA, 29 July 2022) <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/asos-boohoo-and-asda-investigated-over-fashion-green-claims> accessed 1 May 2023.
[36] CMA (n 34).
[37] ibid.
[38] Neil Gunningham and Joseph Rees, ‘Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional Perspective” (1997) 19(4) Law & Policy 363.
[39] At the time of writing, 12 of 88 consumer enforcement cases have led to a court order. CMA, ‘Competition and Markets Authority cases and projects’ <https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases> accessed 1 May 2023.
[40] CMA, ‘Fake and misleading online reviews trading’ (CMA,21 June 2019) <https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/fake-and-misleading-online-reviews> accessed 1 May 2023.
[41] Digital Markets, Competition and Consumer Bill (2022-23) [294].
[42] Competition Bureau, ‘Keurig Canada to pay $3 million penalty’ (Government of Canada,6 January 2022) <https://www.canada.ca/en/competition-bureau/news/2022/01/keurig-canada-to-pay-3-million-penalty-to-settle-competition-bureaus-concerns-over-coffee-pod-recycling-claims.html> accessed 1 May 2023.
[43] Stuart Bell and others, Environmental Law (9th edn, Oxford University Press 2017).
[44] HM Government, ‘Net Zero Strategy: Build Back Greener’ (HM Government, October 2021) <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6194dfa4d3bf7f0555071b1b/net-zero-strategy-beis.pdf> accessed 1 April 2024.
[45] HM Government, ‘Greening Finance: A Roadmap to Sustainable Investing’, (HM Government,October 2021) < https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/61890e64d3bf7f56077ce865/CCS0821102722-006_Green_Finance_Paper_2021_v6_Web_Accessible.pdf> accessed 1 April 2024.
[46] The Occupational Pension Schemes (Climate Change Governance and Reporting) Regulations 2021, SI 2021/839.
[47] Companies (Strategic Report) (Climate-related Financial Disclosure) Regulations 2022, SI 2022/31; Limited Liability Partnerships (Climate-related Financial Disclosure) Regulations 2022, SI 2022/46.
[48] HM Government (n 44).
[49] Lloyd Brown, ‘The climate-related financial disclosure regulations 2022: A step in the right direction for ESG in the private sector’ (2022) 24(3) Environmental Law Review 214.
[50] ibid.
[51] Companies Act 2006 s 414C(14).
[52] Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Review of TCFD-aligned disclosures by premium listed commercial companies’ (Financial Conduct Authority,29 July 2022) <https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/multi-firm-reviews/tcfd-aligned-disclosures-premium-listed-commercial-companies#lf-chapter-id-summary-what-we-found> accessed 1 May 2023.
[53] Companies Act (n 51) s 414C(1).
[54] ibid s 172(d).
[55] ibid s 260.
[56] ClientEarth, ‘ClientEarth files climate risk lawsuit against Shell’s Board with support from institutional investors’ (ClientEarth) <https://www.clientearth.org/latest/press-office/press/clientearth-files-climate-risk-lawsuit-against-shell-s-board-with-support-from-institutional-investors/> accessed 1 May 2023.
[57] Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 ss 90, 90A.
[58] Keay (n 11).
[59] Benjamin (n 6).
[60] HM Government (n 45).
[61] Vogel (n 21).
[62] Virginia Furness and Simon Jessop, ‘Greenwashing crackdown in Europe leaves investors in the dark’ (Reuters, 10 March 2023) <https://www.reuters.com/business/sustainable-business/greenwashing-crackdown-europe-leaves-investors-dark-2023-03-10/> accessed 1 May 2023.
[63] Vibeka Mair, ‘Will Green Taxonomy Delay Help UK “Get it Right”?’ (ESG Investor, 16 January 2023) <https://www.esginvestor.net/will-green-taxonomy-delay-help-uk-get-it-right/> accessed 1 May 2023.
[64] Financial Services and Markets Bill (2022-23) [146].
Claire Li
LLB (LSE) ’23 and Private Law Notes Editor of the LSE Law Review Summer Board 2021