This article uses the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (‘DPRK’) as a case study to evaluate the successes and failures of the United Nations Universal Periodic Review (‘UPR’). This process, established during the creation of the United Nations Human Rights Council (‘UNHRC’) in 2006, including all 193 Members of the UN, is a peer review system of human rights records with recommendations that aim to facilitate interstate dialogue and improve the international protection of human rights. This article argues that the effectiveness of the UPR is mixed. While it has been able to initiate a discussion about human rights with the DPRK, it has, at times, allowed Pyongyang to divert attention from its human rights violations and reframe the narrative surrounding its human rights record.
Introduction
The Universal Periodic Review (‘UPR’) was established by the United Nations (‘UN’) General Assembly in resolution 60/251 in 2006, during the creation of the UNHRC.1 Under this process, all 193 UN Member States review one another’s human rights records and recommend ways to improve their implementation and protection.2 Unlike other mechanisms, such as the Commission of Inquiry (‘COI’) on Human Rights and the Special Rapporteur, conceived as investigatory bodies, the UPR aims to facilitate interstate dialogue.3 By devising a system that reviews each UN Member State’s record every four-and-a-half years, the UNHRC sought to counter charges of politicisation and reinforce the universality of human rights.4 As a result, the UPR is designed to ensure equal treatment for every country when their human rights situations are assessed, with the ultimate goal of improving human rights situations globally.
The DPRK provides an interesting case study to understand some of the UPR’s successes and failures. The country has long maintained a reputation as one of the world’s leading human rights violators, accused of severe restrictions on civil liberties, the execution of political dissidents, and the use of torture.5 Therefore, the DPRK’s willingness to participate in the UPR process comes as an exception to its rejection of other human rights mechanisms, such as the mandate of the Special Rapporteur.6 In December 2009, the DPRK praised the UPR as ‘the most innovative and cooperative mechanism in the [Human Rights] Council’.7 In 2014 and 2019, it submitted its second and third national reports to the UPR Working Group.8
Three cycles later, this article evaluates the UPR’s effectiveness in protecting and promoting human rights. The use of the DPRK as a case study, naturally, does not render the study generalisable to the conduct of other Member States which may have very distinct human rights protection records. However, it does provide some insight into the ability of the process to include countries that have traditionally been hostile towards human rights organisations and UN human rights mechanisms. In this article, the benchmark for evaluating the success of the newly established UPR process is none other than the goals intended in its creation: the de-politicisation of human rights, the enhancement of interstate cooperation, and the attempt to improve the international protection of human rights.9
This article argues that the effectiveness of the UPR is mixed. While it has certainly been able to initiate a discussion about human rights with the DPRK, it has failed to depoliticise them. Instead, the UPR has, at times, allowed the DPRK to divert attention from its human rights violations and reframe the narrative surrounding its human rights record.
Introducing the Universal Periodic Review
The UPR is a unique three-stage process involving the review of the human rights records of all UN Member States. It is a State-driven process that provides each State with an opportunity to declare the actions they have taken to improve the human rights situations in their countries and to fulfil their human rights obligations. This already distinguishes the UPR from other expert-led mechanisms, such as the Special Rapporteur working on a specific thematic or country-specific mandate from the UNHRC.
The first stage of the UPR involves the preparation of three documents necessary for the review.10 The Member State under assessment writes a twenty-page report on the national framework for the protection of human rights and the situation of human rights on the ground, including achievements and obstacles.11 The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) also drafts a shorter ten-page document with information from UN official documents,12 and is responsible for the third document, also ten pages in length, which compiles information from NGOs, grassroots organisations and other civil society stakeholders.13 The reports’ brevity limits coverage, but it is intended to ensure formal equality among States14 — one of the UPR’s central features. The second and third documents are designed to prevent potential biases in self-reporting from the first document. I will delve deeper into questions of self-reporting later in the body of this article.
Next, once the documents are submitted, the actual review takes place through interactive dialogue.15 A meeting lasting three-and-a-half hours is facilitated by a ‘troika’ – three States chosen by lot from UNHRC members to serve as rapporteurs.16 During the dialogue, any UN State may make comments or recommendations to the State under review, but these must be based on the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and human rights instruments to which the State under review is a party.17 The interactive dialogue is then concluded with the adoption of an outcome document summarising the proceedings of the review, and the recommendations that the State concerned accepted, rejected, or has not responded to.18 This stage of the UPR process strives to facilitate interstate dialogue between countries with potentially very different human rights records.
The final stage of the UPR process is the implementation phase.19 Ultimately, the implementation of the recommendations is the full responsibility of the State under review, which may be interpreted as a major weakness.20 However, during the second review, the State is expected to provide information on what they have been doing to implement the recommendations made during the first review, as well as on any developments in the field of human rights.21 If necessary, the UNHRC will address cases where States are not cooperating.22
From the outset, the impact of the UPR cannot be predicted. Many commentators were sceptical about a mechanism solely based on intergovernmental dialogue, resulting in non-binding recommendations from peers.23 The UPR depends entirely on voluntary State cooperation in the process and compliance with the outcome.24 The design of the UPR sought to address the criticisms targeted at other UN human rights mechanisms, including charges of being too political and confrontational and applying double standards while reviewing human rights records.25 The Human Rights Committee, in contrast with the UPR, is a body of independent experts that monitors the implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by State parties. With Rapporteurs, only States accused of violating human rights were addressed by the condemning resolution of the Committee on Human Rights and the General Assembly, which was perceived as unfair by many developing countries. One of the UPR’s strengths is thus its ability to attract States that would otherwise resist discussion of their human rights records. Simultaneously, it renders the UPR easily vulnerable to abuse. Though intended to be ‘non-confrontation[al] and non-politicis[ed]’,26 interactive dialogues can become venues for lambasting rival States while pitching vague, easy-to-implement recommendations to friendly States.27 Moreover, allowing States to claim human rights compliance simply by participating in the process risks reducing the UPR to a series of empty rituals.28
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s Participation in the UPR
The DPRK has long maintained a reputation as one of the world’s worst human rights violators and has frequently criticised the UN’s human rights mechanisms.
First appointed in 2004, the Special Rapporteur regularly reported on human rights abuses to the General Assembly and the UNHRC, though the DPRK had never allowed the Special Rapporteur to visit. The COI, established by the UNHRC in 2013, was charged with collecting evidence of crimes against humanity in the DPRK. Though the DPRK barred commissioners from visiting, the COI collected testimony from over 320 individuals, including eyewitnesses and experts, and produced a report concluding that ‘reasonable grounds’ existed to investigate the DPRK’s leadership for crimes against humanity.29
Since 2003, the General Assembly annually adopted a resolution condemning the DPRK’s human rights record, and urging Pyongyang to end ‘systematic, widespread and grave violations of human rights,’ which include public executions and arbitrary detentions.30 In February 2014, a UN Special Commission published a detailed, 400-page account based on first-hand testimonies documenting ‘unspeakable atrocities’ committed in the country.31 The DPRK rejected these resolutions and reports, arguing that they are politically motivated and reliant on untrue fabrications.
The DPRK’s willing participation in the UPR process is a considerable exception to its rejection of other human rights mechanisms.32 The DPRK submitted its first national report to the UPR Working Group in 2009, the second in 2014, and the third in 2019. Given the country’s frequently delayed reports to UN treaty bodies, its on-time submission of the UPR reports should not be overlooked and indicates that it takes the process seriously.
Self-Reporting: Uneven Accounts
As mentioned earlier, one main feature of the UPR is that Member States review themselves instead of being examined by independent experts.33 As a result, the DPRK’s national reports contain uneven differences in the volume of details supplied in the accounts of social and economic rights and civil and political ones, with the latter being more contentious.34
The reports by the DPRK describe developments in matters such as education, housing, food security, healthcare, and elderly/disability care. The 2009 report provided figures for student enrolment, the number of doctors, hospitals and clinics, child and maternal mortality, and child vaccinations.35 The 2014 report contained information on increases in government education and health care expenditures, infant mortality, chronic malnutrition rates, and numerical figures for new housing units.36 However, on civil and political rights, the reports provided little evidence for the implementation of rights to dignity, life, a fair trial, and participation in social and political life, as well as the prohibition of torture and other inhumane treatment. Similarly vague were the 2009 report claims that no one was ‘arrested, detained or arbitrarily deprived of life’ except for ‘a very serious crime,’ and that capital punishment was imposed ‘only for five categories of extremely serious penal offences’.37 The 2014 and 2019 reports also insisted that capital punishment was rare but provided no data – neither specifying the number of convicts nor their alleged crimes.38
Finally, the reports claim that courts are impartial and that defence counsels for the accused operate flawlessly. They also omit key issues addressed by the COI, including political prison camps, torture, and discrimination based on political background. Therefore, the self-reporting system is effective in getting the DPRK to supply information on social and economic rights, which might not be otherwise accessible. However, at the same time, it is largely ineffective when it comes to civil and political rights, where the DPRK uses the self-reporting system as a means of reframing the narrative surrounding its human rights record. This was a matter certainly anticipated by the creators of the UPR, which explains supplementing the self-report with two documents by the OHCHR, as well as the peer review stage with interactive dialogue. The next section examines the DPRK’s engagement in these interactive dialogues in further detail.
Interactive Dialogues: Reframing the Narrative
In its interactive dialogues, the DPRK depicts itself as respectful of human rights and claims that it has been unfairly targeted for criticism.39 Consistent with this defensive stance, the country categorically denies violating any human rights, insisting that it guarantees freedoms of religion, speech, assembly, and thought. In its first interactive dialogue on 7 December 2009, the delegation began by complaining that it had been singled out for annual human rights resolutions that it rejected as being politically motivated. In the 2014 interactive dialogue, the DPRK struck a similarly defensive tone, denying the existence of political prison camps, widespread public executions, restrictions on civil liberties, and abductions of foreign nationals.40
The interactive dialogue’s format leaves little room to adjudicate competing truth claims. The U.S. Mission Chargé d’Affaires, Mark Cassayre, called on Pyongyang to “immediately dismantle all political prison camps (and) release all political prisoners”.41 Miriam Shearman, Britain’s deputy permanent representative to the UN in Geneva, called on the DPRK to “take immediate action to cease the practice of forced labor”.42 Meanwhile, Pyongyang defends itself from all such accusations: Quoting Pak Kwang Ho, councillor at the central court of the DPRK: “There are still some that persistently insist that political prison camps are operated in our country”.43 This statement reflects the UPR’s biggest weakness: it allows competing truth-claims and the DPRK to reframe the narrative surrounding its human rights record. Yet, while the DPRK rejects the criticisms surrounding gross violations of civil and political rights, the UPR process also forces the country to recognise international human rights instruments and engage with the very language of human rights. This should be seen in a positive light, despite the UPR’s failure to entirely depoliticise human rights, which is arguably impossible to achieve.
Rejecting and Accepting Recommendations
Of the 268 recommendations made by UN Member States during the DPRK’s second UPR in 2014, the DPRK accepted 113, partially accepted 4, took note of 58 and rejected 93.44 After the third round of review, the UPR Working Group made a total of 262 recommendations.45 However, many overlapped with those presented during the second UPR, as the DPRK had failed to show noticeable improvements. In the third cycle, Pyongyang refused to support 63 recommendations, mostly related to civil and political rights: the abolition of political prison camps and the release of political prisoners, the cessation of media censorship, and the elimination of arbitrary detention, torture, and other inhumane treatments.46
In fact, recommendations are also politicised. States with poor human rights records usually praise the DPRK’s human rights record, citing its education, health care, or accession to international human rights instruments while omitting questions of civil and political rights. For example, Burundi ‘commended…the [DPRK’s] human rights education program’,47 Bangladesh ‘expressed admiration’ for the DPRK’s legislation on women’s rights;48 and Syria expressed ‘appreciation of the country’s efforts to improve living standards despite challenges, notably economic sanctions’.49 Conversely, countries with better records were far more critical, raising concerns about civil and political rights, various alleged abuses, and the DPRK’s refusal to cooperate with the Special Rapporteur and COI.50
In 2014, the DPRK immediately rejected recommendations ‘slander[ing] the country [and] driven by sinister political motivations’ and deemed them ‘incompatible with the social system and domestic law of the DPRK’.51 It also ‘noted’ recommendations that it regarded as presently unsuitable but worthy of future consideration.52 In 2014, the DPRK also rejected all calls to implement the COI report’s recommendations, admit the Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in the DPRK, accede to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and establish a national human rights institution.53 On capital punishment, the DPRK suggested somewhat greater receptivity, noting rather than immediately rejecting them, but this did not imply any commitment to action. Furthermore, to date, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK has not been allowed to visit the country. Individuals, including both DPRK and foreign citizens, continue to be detained or imprisoned without being given a fair trial in accordance with international human rights standards.54 Furthermore, the DPRK did not accept recommendations to ensure humane treatment for all prisoners or other detainees.55
In contrast, the DPRK accepted many development-related recommendations, including those pertaining to food security, health care, education, and humanitarian aid. Furthermore, the DPRK acceded to several international treaties. The ratification of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities came in line with recommendations from the UPR — notably from Tunisia, France, Ghana and Estonia.56 In line with recommendations from Iran, Cuba, Thailand, Norway and Angola, the government also resumed submission of periodic reports to the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which can be seen as steps to promote the human rights of children and women.57 As a reviewer, the DPRK pitched highly critical recommendations to political rivals (who typically had stronger human rights records) while making weak recommendations to political allies with poor human rights records.
Therefore, the UPR has not been able to depoliticise human rights entirely, with political alliances playing a large role in the review of certain countries. However, it has certainly been successful in getting the DPRK (and other countries that would not otherwise take part) to engage with human rights mechanisms, to ratify certain international treaties, and to adopt the language of human rights protection.
Human Rights on the Ground
Finally, in the successful protection of human rights, ‘gestures are not enough’.58 The effectiveness of the UPR should be assessed according to the actual improvement of human rights on the ground. Amnesty International’s main concerns regarding the human rights situation on the ground concern the right to access information, the treatment of prisoners and other detainees, the freedom of its citizens to travel abroad, and the death penalty.59 The government continues to exercise severe restrictions over information exchanges between people.60 All telecommunications, postal and broadcasting services are state-owned, and there are no independent newspapers, other media or civil society organisations.61 Apart from a select few in the ruling elite, the general population has no access to the internet or international mobile phone services.62 Systematic, widespread, and gross human rights violations continue: up to 120,000 people remain in detention in four known political prison camps and they are at a risk of forced labour, torture and other ill-treatment.63 As for the death penalty, the DPRK continues to shroud its use in secrecy, with no official statistics. Amnesty International argues that death sentences are carried out extensively, often after unfair trials and without the possibility of appeal,64 but the lack of transparency surrounding the death penalty makes it impossible to determine the frequency of its use. Furthermore, in February 2014, a UN COI issued a landmark report concluding that the DPRK’s human rights abuses likely constituted crimes against humanity.65
In the third UPR meeting, the DPRK denied the existence of political prisoners and political prison camps. On the other hand, the DPRK responded positively to recommendations concerning: cooperating with the international community to promote healthcare, education, food, and nutrition; enabling international humanitarian agencies to operate in the country to support the vulnerable; and promoting public health and well-being in line with the UN Sustainable Development Goals.66
To an extent, it appears that the DPRK uses the UPR to divert attention from its human rights violations, reframing the narrative surrounding its human rights record and challenging the legitimacy of human rights mechanisms like the COI and Special Rapporteur.67 The UPR’s reliance on self-reporting affords the DPRK greater control of its human rights narrative than the COI or Special Rapporteur. Furthermore, by supporting countries with which it shares similar human rights views, making recommendations that they accept, and receiving supportive statements by political allies, the DPRK can foster the notion that it is serious about upholding human rights and that its positions represent a broader movement. The interactive dialogue’s format leaves little room to adjudicate competing truth claims. The DPRK thus benefits from cooperation with international human rights mechanisms without always having to reform its human rights policies. Unfortunately, while the UPR is not perfect, it may be the only way of getting the DPRK to engage with the UN’s human rights mechanisms and discuss the country’s human rights record.
Civil and Political Rights vs. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
While the DPRK has shown negligible progress on the improvement of civil and political rights and has hardly provided new responses to the concerns of the international community on those matters, it remains relatively open to causes related to economic, social, and cultural rights.
In the National Report of DPRK in the third cycle of the UPR, the Kim Jong-un administration did establish various national committees and enact new laws and policies to improve human rights conditions in DPRK. This included organising the National Committee for the Implementation of International Human Rights Instruments in 2015 and the National Committee for the Protection of Persons with Disabilities in 2016.68 The third report also stressed on Pyongyang’s systematic promotion of social rights of the people by launching and implementing several national plans such as the Mid-Term Strategy for the Development of the Health Sector of the DPRK (2016–2020), the 5-Year Strategy for National Economic Development (2016–2020), the Strategy for Expansion of Integrated Management of Child Illness (2005–2020), the National Strategy for the Development of Education (2015–2032), the Strategy for the Protection of Persons with Disabilities (2018–2020), and the Strategic Plan for the Care of the Elderly (2016–2018).69 In the third report, the DPRK also showed efforts to improve the human rights of vulnerable groups such as women, children, persons with disabilities, and the elderly. The report detailed the construction of new schools and children’s homes between 2014 and 2017, and recuperation facilities for persons with disabilities between 2016 and 2018.70
These efforts indicate the DPRK’s active intervention in protecting vulnerable groups and promoting their rights. In fact, in May 2017, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities, Catalina Devandas Aguilar, became the first UN Human Rights Council’s independent expert to conduct a country visit of the DPRK and, after her visit, she praised initiatives already undertaken to improve the lives of persons with disabilities in the country.71 However, Devandas Aguilar also observed that the majority of infrastructure is not accessible to persons with disabilities. Further, she noted the stigma that persons with disabilities face in the country, which is reinforced by the use of certain language such as “normal” and “sane”, by the lack of accessibility to infrastructure, and in the educational, healthcare, and social protection systems.72 Therefore, while the efforts discussed in the previous paragraphs are certainly an important step towards getting the DPRK to engage with the UN’s human rights framework, these only constitute the first of many steps needed. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the DPRK shows little signs of improvement when it comes to the protection of the civil and political rights of its citizens.
Finally, the third report highlighted the DPRK’s initiatives of cooperation with the international community. Over the course of the last few years, the country submitted its fifth and sixth periodic reports on the implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in 2016,73 second to fourth periodic reports on the implementation of the CEDAW in 2016.74 It also ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography in 2014 and the Convention on the Rights of the Persons with Disabilities in 2016.75 Further, as mentioned before, it allowed the visit of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to the country in 2017.76 The participation of the DPRK in the activities of the international community should be seen as a positive development. However, political rights and social rights are interdependent and inseparably linked. Social rights without political rights or vice versa cannot fulfil the basic requirement of being rights, as there are no mechanisms to ensure their enforcement.
Conclusion
As illustrated in this article, the UPR’s effectiveness in protecting human rights is mixed. The DPRK’s UPR participation is a positive development in the sense that its written and oral statements establish a base of factual claims by which to measure its future human rights progress. Its willingness to accept some specific recommendations suggests opportunities for multilateral cooperation to nudge its human rights toward international standards. The UPR’s non-confrontational approach can facilitate ‘principled engagement’ with the DPRK by shifting the focus away from regime change and punishment, and toward incremental human rights improvements and technical implementation.77 However, the DPRK’s participation in the UPR, though an encouraging development for human rights, cannot supplant the fact-finding and accountability mechanisms of the Special Rapporteur and COI. Disappointingly, the UPR has allowed the DPRK to divert attention from its human rights violations and reframe the narrative surrounding its human rights record.
[1] United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) ‘Basic facts about the UPR’ (OHCHR, 2021) <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/upr/pages/basicfacts.aspx> accessed 26 September 2021.
[2] ibid.
[3] ibid.
[4] Elvira Domínguez-Redondo ‘The Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council: An Assessment of the First Session’ (2008) 7(3) Chinese Journal of International Law <https://academic.oup.com/chinesejil/article/7/3/721/499158?login=true> accessed 26 September 2021.
[5] ‘North Korea, Country Page’ (Human Rights Watch, 2021) <https://www.hrw.org/asia/north-korea> accessed 26 September 2021.
[6] Jonathan T. Chow ‘North Korea’s participation in the Universal Periodic Review of Human Rights’ (2017) 71(2) Australian Journal of International Affairs <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10357718.2016.1241978?needAccess=true> accessed 26 September 2021.
[7] UNHRC ‘Report on the Human Rights Council on its Thirteenth Session’ (8 February 2011), UN Doc A/HRC/13/56, para 602 <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G11/117/56/PDF/G1111756.pdf?OpenElement> accessed 13 December 2021.
[8] United Nations Human Rights Council ‘Universal Periodic Review Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’ (OHCHR, 2021) <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/KPindex.aspx> accessed 26 September 2021. See also: United Nations General Assembly ‘National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 16/21, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’ 33rd session (20 February 2019) UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/33/PRK/1. See also: United Nations General Assembly ‘National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 16/21, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’ 19th session (30 January 2014) UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/19/PRK/1.
[9] UNHRC (n 1).
[10] Human Rights Council ‘General Guidelines for the Preparation of Information under the Universal Periodic Review’ (2007) UN Doc A/HRC/6/102, paras. B-F.
[11] ibid.
[12] Human Rights Council ‘Institution-building of the United Nations Human Rights Council’ 9th meeting (18 June 2007) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/5/1, para. 15 (b).
[13] Human Rights Project at the Urban Justice Centre, ‘A practical guide to the United Nations’ Universal Periodic Review (UPR)’ (January 2010).
[14] Jane K. Cowan and Julie Billaud ‘Between Learning and Schooling: The Politics of Human Rights Monitoring at the Universal Periodic Review’ (2015) 36(6) Third World Quarterly <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01436597.2015.1047202?needAccess=true> accessed 26 September 2021.
[15] Human Rights Project (n 13).
[16] Chow (n 6).
[17] UNHRC (n 1).
[18] HRC ‘Institution-building’ (n 12) para 26.
[19] ibid, para 33.
[20] Human Rights Council ‘Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group on the Review of the Work and Functioning of the Human Rights Council: List of stakeholder contributions’ 1st session (29 October 2010) UN Doc A/HRC/WG.8/1/CRP.2, para L (4), 1.
[21] UNHRC (n 1).
[22] ibid.
[23] Elvira Domínguez-Redondo ‘The Universal Periodic Review: Is There Life Beyond Naming and Shaming in Human Rights Implementation?’ (2012) 4 New Zealand Law Review <https://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/11902/1/SSRN-id2111607.pdf> accessed 26 September 2021.
[24] Anette Faye Jacobsen ‘Spot on Universal Periodic Review: An Introduction’ (2010) 1 The Danish Institute for Human Rights <https://www.upr-info.org/sites/default/files/general-document/pdf/ifm-spot-on-en.pdf> accessed 26 September 2021. See also: Purna Sen and Monica Vincent, Universal Periodic Review of Human Rights: Towards Best Practice (Commonwealth Secretariat 2011).
[25] Delegates Argue over Objectivity, Double Standards in Human Rights Council, as General Assembly Considers Annual Report’ (United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, 2 November 2018) <https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/ga12087.doc.htm> accessed 28 September 2021.
[26] UNHRC, 37th Session ‘Annual high-level panel discussion on human rights mainstreaming’ (26 February 2018) <https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/UPR/SummaryHRC%2037_HL_Panel_Mainstreaming.docx> accessed 13 December 2021.
[27] Cowan and Billaud (n 14).
[28] Walter Kälin ‘Ritual and Ritualism at the Universal Periodic Review: A Preliminary Appraisal’ in Hilary Charlesworth and Emma Larking (eds), _Human Rights and the Universal Periodic Review: Rituals and Ritualism_Cambridge University Press 2014) 25-41.
[29] UNHRC, 25th Session, ‘Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’ (7 February 2014) UN Doc A/HRC/25/63, paras 74–79, 94.
[30] Paolo Cammarota and others, ‘Legal Strategies for Protecting Human Rights in North Korea’ (2007) U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea <https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Legal_Strategies_for_Protecting_Human_Rights_in_North_Korea.pdf> accessed 27 September 2021.
[31] UNHRC (n 29).
[32] Chow (n 6).
[33] Maximilian Spohr ‘United Nations Human Rights Council: Between Institution-Building Phase and Review of Status’ (2010) 14 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law <https://www.mpil.de/files/pdf3/mpunyb_05_spohr_14.pdf> accessed 28 September 2021.
[34] Chow (n 6).
[35] UNHRC, Sixth Session 30 November – 11 December 2009 ‘National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 15(A) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1 – Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’ (27 August 2009) UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/6/PRK/1, paras 63, 71, 73.
[36] UNHRC Nineteenth Session 28 April – 9 May 2014 ‘National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 16/21: [Universal Periodic Review]: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’ (30 January 2014) UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/19/PRK/1, paras 50–57, 66–67.
[37] UNHRC (n 35), para 34.
[38] UNHRC (n 36), paras 30–33.
[39] Chow (n 6).
[40] UNHRC ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’, UN Doc A/HRC/27/10, 2 July 2014.
[41] ‘N. Korea rejects prison camps claims in rare rights council review’ (Yahoo! News, 9 May 2019) <https://news.yahoo.com/n-korea-rejects-prison-camps-claims-rare-rights-163917417.html?guccounter=1> accessed 26 September 2021.
[42] ibid.
[43] ibid.
[44] United Nations General Assembly, ‘Addendum to the Report of the Working Group on the Universal Period Review: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’ 27th session (12 September 2014) UN Doc A/HRC/27/10/Add.1.
[45] Sookyung Kim ‘Assessment of the 3rd Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of the DPRK and the Ways to Improve Human Rights in North Korea’ (2019) Korean Institute for National Unification Online Series <https://repo.kinu.or.kr/bitstream/2015.oak/10262/1/co19-09.pdf> accessed 26 September 2021.
[46] ibid.
[47] UNHRC ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’, UN Doc A/HRC/27/10, 2 July 2014, para. 39.
[48] ibid, para 33.
[49] ibid, para 109.
[50] For example, in the Second Cycle’s Report of the Working Group, “Italy expressed concern about the death penalty, undue restrictions of freedom of movement, the criminalization of repatriated citizens and gender discrimination. It stressed the need for cooperation with international mechanisms”, and “Ireland expressed concern about the unparalleled human rights situation, reports of rape and sexual abuse of women in detention, chronic food insecurity and malnutrition”.
[51] Patricia Goedde ‘Human Rights Diffusion in North Korea: The Impact of Transnational Legal Mobilization’ (2018) 5 Asian Journal of Law and Society 175 <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/asian-journal-of-law-and-society/article/human-rights-diffusion-in-north-korea-the-impact-of-transnational-legal-mobilization/A888AD94D6BC55FA8734AD7271DA89BE> accessed 27 September 2021.
[52] UNHRC ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’, UN Doc A/HRC/27/10, 2 July 2014, paras 3, 5–8.
[53] Kim (n 45).
[54] Amnesty International ‘Democratic People’s Republic of Korean: Gestures are not enough’ 33rd session of the UPR Working Group (May 2019) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa24/9712/2019/en/> accessed 26 September 2021.
[55] UNHRC Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, UN Doc A/HRC/27/10, 2 July 2014, recommendations 124.77-124.90 (Namibia, Slovakia, Spain, Macedonia, Italy, Sierra Leone, Turkey, Ecuador, Belgium, Costa Rica, Lithuania, France, Hungary, Montenegro), 124.92 (Germany), 124.95 (Spain), 124.101 (New Zealand).
[56] UNHRC ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Period Review’, UN Doc A/HRC/A/HRC/ 27/10, 2 July 2014, recommendations 124.7 (Tunisia), 124.15 (France), 124.16 (Ghana), 124.17 (Estonia).
[57] UNHRC ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Period Review’, UN Doc A/HRC/27/10, 2 July 2014, recommendations 124.30 (Iran), 124.34 (Cuba), 124.37 (Thailand), 124.64 (Norway), 124.69 (Angola).
[58] Kim (n 45).
[59] Amnesty International (n 54).
[60] UNHRC ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Period Review’, UN Doc A/HRC/27/10, 2 July 2014, recommendations 124.130 (Indonesia) and 124.137 (Myanmar).
[61] Amnesty International ‘Democratic People’s Republic of Korean: Gestures are not enough’ 33rd session of the UPR Working Group (May 2019) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa24/9712/2019/en/> accessed 26 September 2021.
[62] ‘Committee on the Rights of the Child considers the report of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’ (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 20 September 2017) <www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22120&LangID=E> accessed 26 September 2021.
[63] Amnesty International (n 61).
[64] Amnesty International (n 54).
[65] UNHRC (n 29).
[66] Kim (n 45).
[67] Chow (n 6).
[68] Kim (n 45).
[69] ibid.
[70] United Nations General Assembly ‘National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 16/21, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’ 33rd session (20 February 2019) UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/33/PRK/1.
[71] ‘End of Mission Statement by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities, Ms. Catalina Devandas-Aguilar, on her visit to the DPRK’ (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 8 May 2017) <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21610&LangID=E> accessed 3 October 2021.
[72] ibid.
[73] United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child ‘Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 44 of the Convention, Fifth periodic reports of States parties due in 2012, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’ (25 October 2016) <https://undocs.org/CRC/C/PRK/5> accessed 3 October 2021.
[74] United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women ‘Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 18 of the Convention, Second, third and fourth periodic reports of States parties due in 2014, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’ (1 June 2016) <https://undocs.org/CEDAW/C/PRK/2-4> accessed 3 October 2021.
[75] Goedde (n 51).
[76] OHCHR (n 71).
[77] Morten Pedersen and David Kinley, ‘Introducing Principles Engagement’ in Morten Pedersen and David Kinley (eds) Principled Engagement: Negotiating Human Rights in Repressive States (Ashgate 2013) 1–11.
Eponine Howarth
BSc Politics and IR (LSE), LLB (LSE) and Public International Law Notes Editor of the LSE Law Review Summer Board 2021